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Zusammenfassung 
Sind internationale Übergangsverwaltungen ein geeignetes und damit universell einsetzbares  
Instrument zur Friedenskonsolidierung in ethno-politischen Konflikten? Zur Beantwortung 
dieser Frage werden Bedingungen, Struktur, Auftrag und Ressourcen sowie das Ergebnis 
dreier Übergangsverwaltungen in Ex-Jugoslawien vergleichend geprüft. Die Untersuchung 
zeigt, dass die sukzessive von der Europäischen Union, den Vereinten Nationen und dem 
Büro des Hohen Repräsentanten für Bosnien eingerichteten Verwaltungen unterschiedliche 
Voraussetzungen mitbringen, um ihre Mission zum Erfolg zu führen, und demzufolge zu 
unterschiedlichen Ergebnissen kommen. Es wird deutlich, dass eine Reihe von Bedingungen 
erfüllt sein muss, damit die eingesetzte Verwaltung nicht zwischen den lokalen Parteien 
aufgerieben oder von ihnen zu ihrem Vorteil ausgenutzt wird. Zu den notwendigen 
Voraussetzungen für eine erfolgreiche Verwaltung zählen die politische Kohärenz innerhalb 
der verantwortlichen internationalen Organisation, Konsistenz im gesamten Aktionsfeld der 
Verwaltung sowie ihre Fähigkeit, Macht auszuüben. Weitere Ergebnisse der Untersuchung 
sind, dass, erstens, die Verbesserung der Lebensverhältnisse nicht zwangsläufig neues Ver-
trauen zwischen den ehemaligen Kriegsparteien entstehen läßt und damit zur Konfliktösung 
beiträgt, und zweitens, dass die Parteien weder durch materielle Anreize noch durch 
diplomatischen Druck zur Zusammenarbeit bewegt werden können, wenn ihre Interessen im 
Widerstreit zum Handlungsauftrag der Verwaltung stehen.  
 
 
 
Abstract 
Are transitional administrations a suitable and universally applicable peace-building tool after 
ethno-political war? In order to answer this question, this study compares the conditions, 
structures, mandates, resources and outcomes of three transitional administrations in former 
Yugoslavia. My analysis will show that the administrations, which were created in short suc-
cession by the European Union, the United Nations and the High Representative for Bosnia, 
brought along various assumptions as to how to fulfill their mission and, as a result, achieve 
different results. The lesson emerges that a host of preconditions must be in place to prevent 
the administration from becoming a mere plaything of the local parties or being exploited for 
practical advantage. These preconditions for a successful operation include political 
coherence within the responsible international organisation, consistency in the entire 
administrative field of action, as well as the capability to use the power at its disposal. Further 
insights emerge, first, that improvements in the standard of living do not necessarily lead to 
the reestablishment of trust between formerly warring parties nor contribute to permanent 
conflict resolution; and second, that the parties cannot be forced to cooperate in reward for 
material benefits or through diplomatic pressure, when their own interests run contrary to the 
administration’s mandate.   
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 1 
Introduction 
 
For several reasons the Yugoslav war has challenged the international community to 
develop new strategies of conflict resolution and peace-building. First, it was an intrastate 
conflict imposing limits to international intervention beyond emergency relief assistance. 
Second, the conflict was a complex one, which revealed a tremendous brutality between 
various ethnical groups. And third, the inhumanity of mass murder, rape and wholesale 
destruction had not been seen in Europe since the Second World War. As a result, for four 
years no concerted conflict resolution effort of the international community could bring peace 
to the Balkans.  
The concept of international administrations was assumed to meet the challenge. Con-
sequently, three transitional administrations were established in rapid succession by different 
international organisations in former Yugoslavia to help accelerate the overall peace process 
through regional societal reconciliation, political development and physical reconstruction:  
 
1) the European Administration in Mostar (EUAM), Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1994-96, 
2) the UN Transitional Administration in Eastern Slavonia (UNTAES), Croatia, 1996-98, 
3) the International Supervisory Regime of the Office of the High Representative in Brcko 
(OHR-North), Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1997- still operating.  
 
With the European Administration in Mostar a new, post-Cold War, international 
agenda for peace-building was put into practice. This extended the sphere of international in-
volvement in post-conflict situations from keeping warring sides apart to taking the lead in 
developing long-term political solutions in a multi-ethnic environment.1 In the view of the 
international community the outcome of this first test for institutionalising transitional 
administrations was unsatisfactory. When the subsequent UN Transitional Administration 
(UNTAES) was established in Eastern Slavonia, it was referred to Mostar with the mandate 
"to draw lessons and avoid repetition of failures"2. The question arising is, what lessons were 
learned from Mostar for the later UN operation in Eastern Slavonia? As a consequence, was 
the UN in Eastern Slavonia more succesful? Furthermore, has the later established 
Supervisory Regime in Brcko drawn lessons from the earlier two transitional administrations? 
What can possibly be learned from the three transitional administrations for future 
international peace-building activities in ethno-political post-war conditions, e.g. Kosovo?  
                                                 
1  David Chandler, Bosnia: Faking Democracy After Dayton, London 1999, p.79. 
2  European Commission, Ad Hoc Ex-Yougoslavie, Doc Seance N° 164.  
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This analysis uses three indicators for measuring the success or failure of three 
multinational operations, as proposed by Thomas G. Weiss. The first and most essential 
indicator in measuring success is "(...) a judicious correlation between resources and 
rhetoric"3. The concrete question here is whether there is a gap between the agreed policy and 
the willingness to provide the necessary means to execute it in the field. A second indicator in 
determining success or failure of multinational operations is to measure their relative 
effectiveness in avoiding substantial shortcomings. A successful operation would represent 
"(...) an effective and coherent orchestration of civil, humanitarian and political efforts under 
a protective umbrella of military security"4. The third indicator should be "the comprehensive 
nature of inputs"5. Weiss is of the opinion that the approach of multinational operations 
should not be too narrow. When one aspect of the operation is in trouble, compensation by the 
pursuit of others should be possible.  
The subsequently presented findings are preliminary and offered for discussion. There 
is no claim to being comprehensive.  
 
1. Three transitional administrations: Origins and mandates 
 
1.1 Mostar - The city of burnt bridges 
 
Prior to the war, Mostar was an economical, political and cultural centre. The Mostar 
valley was a significant industrial area with factories producing helicopters, aluminium, 
beverages, clothes and agricultural products. The main river of the Herzegovina region, the 
Neretva, divides the city into two unequal parts, the greater and more developed West and the 
smaller and hilly East. In May 1993, after the Croats and ‘Muslim‘ Bosniacs had jointly 
resisted the Serbian siege of Mostar, the Croats turned against the Bosniacs and began a 
bloody ten-month ‘war within the war’. Both fought to claim the city as a place of cultural 
heritage and used torture, forced expulsion, rape and murder to that end. The Croats pursued 
the aim of controlling Mostar as the capital of the Republic of Herceg-Bosna, their self-
declared Bosnian Croat state founded in the autumn of 1993.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3  Thomas G. Weiss, The United Nations and Civil Wars at the Dawn of the Twenty-First Century, in: 
Thomas G. Weiss, The United Nations and Civil Wars, Boulder 1995, p.197.  
4  Ibid., p.199. 
5  Ibid. 
 
 3 
1.1.1 From the Invincible Peace Talks to the European Administration (EUAM) 
 
In September 1993, the Owen/Stoltenberg peace plan, which proposed a ‘Union of the 
Republics of Bosnia and Herzegovina’ consisting of three constituent entities was negotiated 
on board of the HMS Invincible.6 A document was drawn up also proposing special admini-
strative arrangements for the multi-ethnic and therefore difficult city of Mostar with the parti-
cipation of the European Community (EC).7 In October, while fierce fighting between the 
Croats and Bosniacs continued in Mostar, the Bosniac Parliament rejected this ‘Confederation 
Plan’.8 With this rejection, the ‘Invincible Document’ envisaging an European Administration 
in Mostar also failed. The matter was then left pending.9   
Half a year later, after a grenade had struck again the central market in Sarajevo, killing 
at least 68 civilians, US President Bill Clinton launched a diplomatic initiative with the aim of 
preventing the spread of war and refugees in Europe. On 18 March 1994, the Washington 
Peace Agreement created a Federation between the Bosnian Croats and Bosniacs. By the end 
of March, the Parliament of Bosnia and Herzegovina unanimously approved the Constitution 
of the Federation,10 consisting of eight cantons, four of which were to be Bosniac, two Croat 
and two mixed. Due to the lack of consensus concerning the areas of formerly fierce fighting, 
it was concluded that the two peoples would have to share the power in the disputed regions. 
One of those regions was the Neretva Canton of which Mostar is the capital, thus paving the 
way for the European Union Administration. 
Following an invitation by the two parties that signed the Washington Agreement, the 
EU General Affairs Council formally decided on 16 May 1994 to carry out its first major 
Joint Action to support the administration of the city of Mostar. The Joint Action was 
                                                 
6  For several months the three conflicting parties had not been able to reach an agreement on the questions 
regarding territory boundaries, access to the Adriatic Sea and Sava River, and the connecting passages 
between specified enclaves as well as for the multi-ethnic cities of Sarajevo and Mostar. Marie-Janine 
Calic, Der Krieg in Bosnien-Hercegovina, Ursachen-Konfliktstrukturen-Internationale Lösungsversuche, 
Frankfurt/Main 1995, S. 192.  
7  The same arrangement was made for the complicated Sarajevo district with the involvement of the United 
Nations (UN). The Croats had objected the initial idea of the Contact Group also to establish a UN-
administration in Mostar.  
8  Their grounds were firstly the 31% of the republic’s territory adjudged to the Bosniacs, which did not 
correspond to their percentage of 43,7% of the population. Instead, it approved the military situation on the 
ground. Secondly, the Bosnian Serbs and Croats were guaranteed the prospect of joining their mother 
countries later, while for the Bosniacs no similar opportunity existed. 
9  In the meantime, a German initiative lead to the Petersberg I Agreement of 10 January 1994, which aimed 
at the establishment of permanent and integral peace between the Croatian and the ‘Muslim‘ peoples in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, and revived the idea of an European Administration in Mostar. Nevertheless, this 
agreement had not brought the expected peace but laid the foundation for the subsequent Washington 
Agreement. 
10  Bosnia and Herzegovina: Constitution of the Federation, in: International Legal Materials, Vol. XXXIII, 
May 1994 (3), Art.1, p.775. 
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introduced with the Treaty on the European Union (TEU) as an instrument to bundle all 
available means for the effective pursuance and implementation of the aims within the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).  
On 23 July 1994 the European Union Administration of Mostar (EUAM) was 
established.  
 
1.1.2 The Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) 
    
Mostar was to serve as a model for the obstacles that the Federation would need to 
overcome in order to ensure lasting peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Therefore, the 
President of Croatia, Franjo Tudjman, was present when Hans Koschnick11, the European 
Administrator, inaugurated the administration, sending a clear signal to the radical nationalists 
among the Bosnian Croats that there was no possibility of the self-proclaimed Republic of 
Herceg-Bosna to join the Republic of Croatia.12 Furthermore, in return for a Croat-Bosniac 
Federation economically, but not politically tied to Croatia, the Bosnian Croats were required 
to rescind their declaration of the Republic of Herceg-Bosna. 
The EU Administration drew its mandate from the Memorandum of Understanding on 
the EUAM, signed on 5 July 1994 by the EU, the Western European Union (WEU) Member 
States, the two mayors of the town, Safet Orucevic and Mijo Brajkovic, as well as Alija Izet-
begovic, the President of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Haris Silajdzic for the Federation and Ja-
dranko Prlic as the representative of the Bosnian Croats.  
The MoU stipulates that the municipality of Mostar would be governed by the EUAM 
for a maximum of two years. The EUAM’s aim was to overcome the town’s ethnic division 
between the Bosniac Bosniacs and Croats through a process of physical reconstruction and 
political and social reunification. The overall objective was to give the parties time to find a 
lasting solution for the administration of Mostar. Hence, the EUAM was to: 
• contribute to a climate leading to a single, self-sustaining, multi-ethnic  
 administration 
• hold democratic elections before the end of EUAM 
• assist the return to normal life in the city 
• restore public utilities 
• ensure protection of human rights 
• enable the return of refugees and displaced persons 
• assist in organising and providing humanitarian aid 
• prepare and implement programmes for economic reconstruction 
• ensure the maintenance of public order 
                                                 
11  Hans Koschnick is a senior German politician, who was the Mayor of the Hansestadt Bremen for 18 years. 
12  Interview with Hans Koschnick, EU Administrator, 26 July 1995, Bremen.  
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• re-establish all public functions 
• and guarantee the national, religious and cultural identity of all the people in the area 
under EU Administration, in compliance with the Constitution of the Federation of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina.  
 
Due to the existing gap in living conditions and economic activities between East and West 
Mostar, it was part of the mandate to support the people in Mostar East in order to equalize 
the living conditions, which would in turn facilitate normalisation and reconciliation with the 
Western part.13 
In May 1995, the EUAM itself realised that its objectives were too wide-ranging and 
ambitious within a situation of continuing conflict, lasting mistrust and tension between the 
parties that had to be united. Therefore, the aims and principles were further developed in a 
strategy paper prepared by the Administrator. Although a single administration remained the 
fundamental objective, the main criteria considered essential to the commonly accepted con-
cept of a unified city included: 
 
• a population willing to live under a common set of rules 
• a central municipal authority acceptable to the population 
• a common legal framework 
• guaranteed rights for all citizens independent of religion, language and culture 
• a common public service, tax system, and police force 
• and guaranteed freedom of movement.14  
 
The principal assumptions upon which this strategy document was prepared were that: 
 
• the Federation would remain intact and further developed 
• the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) would remain in the region 
 with its existing strength unchanged 
• the shelling by the Bosnian Serb Army (BSA) would not reach a level that  
 rendered the task of the EU Administration impossible 
• and the EUAM would progressively gain the confidence of the citizens and  
 not be obstructed in achieving its aims and objectives by any of the parties.  
 
The same criteria will be applied on the other two transitional administrations to show where 
they emerged from and what their objectives were. The topic demands that each admini-
stration be dealt with seperately and in succession.  
                                                 
13 "(...) to assist in the return to normal life for all citizens of the Mostar city Municipality (...)", MoU, Aims 
and Principles, Article 2. 
14  Strategy for the EU Administration of Mostar, 13 May 1995. 
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1.2 Eastern Slavonia - The prosperous border region 
 
The region consists of two sub-regions divided by the Drava river: Baranja in the north, 
and Eastern Slavonia and Western Sirmium, south of the Drava. Eastern Slavonia is a large 
fertile plain that had one of the highest per capita incomes in the former Yugoslavia. It served 
as its granary and has significant oil deposits in the south. Textile and heavy industry, petro-
chemicals, intermediate food processing and consumer goods were the main industrial activi-
ties. Hungary borders the region to the north and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) 
shares the Danube river as a border with the region to the east. The regional economy is 
strongly integrated with the FRY.  
 
1.2.1 From a United Nations Protected Area to the UN Transitional Administration  
(UNTAES) 
 
In May 1991, a referendum was held regarding Croatia’s future. On 25 June 1991, the 
Republic of Croatia declared its independence from the Socialist Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (SFRY). The Serb population in Croatia opposed independence, and Belgrade 
decided to use force to keep the country together. Eastern Slavonia, the far east Croatian 
region bordering the Serbian Vojvodina, was then overrun by the Yugoslav National Army 
(YNA) and became the theatre of heavy fighting. Under the Vance Peace Plan the region of 
Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium, along with the Krajina region and Western 
Slavonia, became a United Nations Protected Area (UNPA) in Croatia.15 In those Serb-held 
areas, UNPROFOR was deployed to create the conditions of peace and security required to 
settle the Yugoslavia conflict.16 
In March 1994, after negotiations sponsored by the Zagreb-4,17 a Ceasefire Agreement 
was signed by the Croats and the Croatian Serbs.18 After several failed attempts to bring the 
two parties together, the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia (ICFY)19 succee-
                                                 
15  The UNPAs were areas of Serbian majority or a substantial minority where inter-communal strife had taken 
place.  
16  UNPROFOR was deployed as per Security Council Resolution 749 of April 1992. Although greatly 
reduced by the presence of the UN troops, hostilities between the warring factions in the UNPA Sector East 
(Eastern Slavonia) continued. 
17  A group whose members included the Ambassadors of the United States, the Russian Federation, 
representatives of the European Union and the UN. 
18  With the signing of the CFA, UNPROFOR acquired the role of a classical peace-keeping force, positioned 
between the warring factions in Zones of Separation. 
19  The ICFY was led by the International Contact Group comprising France, Germany, Russia, the United 
Kingdom and the United States, founded in April 1994 following a Russian initiative. 
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ded in having an Economic Agreement20 signed in December.21 In January 1995, Croatian 
President Franjo Tudjman announced that the mandate of UNPROFOR would not be renewed 
upon expiry on 30 March 1995. A Zagreb-4 Plan for the peaceful re-integration of Serb-held 
areas into Croatia was presented in February. The Croatian leadership gave a qualified 
endorsement to the plan as a basis for discussion. The Croatian Serbs rejected it. They 
considered the timing of the plan’s presentation as rewarding Tudjman’s hard line on 
UNPROFOR’s mandate and made the renewal of its term a pre-condition for further 
negotiations. As a result, in March the terms of a transformed peace-keeping operation were 
set forth,22 now called the United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation (UNCRO) to 
perform all functions envisaged in the Ceasefire Agreement: to facilitate the implementation 
of the Economic Agreement and to assist in the control of Croatia’s international border with 
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.  
                                                
On 1 May 1995, Croatia launched the military operation ‘Flash’ to reclaim the Krajina. 
With the operation ‘Storm’ in early August, Western Slavonia was brought back under Croat 
control. As a consequence, approximately 200,000 Serbs fled from Western Slavonia and the 
Krajina. Several thousand found their way to Eastern Slavonia. Despite the volatile military 
situation, fighting did not escalate in Eastern Slavonia. UNCRO began talks with the Croatian 
government and the local Serbs to reduce the tensions and encourage a dialogue on the future 
of the region. On 26 August 1995, these initiatives led to a ceasefire within the framework of 
the March 1994 Ceasefire Agreement.  
The Croatian Parliament was dissolved in late September and elections were scheduled for 
October. Before its dissolution, the Parliament amended the Property Law, so that abandoned 
property would come under State control if not claimed within thirty days. Furthermore, it 
passed a bill postponing implementation of the Constitutional Act on Minorities. Both pieces 
of legislation raised questions about Croatia’s willingness to create viable conditions for the 
normalisation of life for its Serb minority. Croatian policy appeared to follow a two-track ap-
proach, calling for the peaceful integration of the region while at the same time keeping the 
military option open. Consequently, a  new round of diplomatic efforts initiated in the begin-
ning of October by the ICFY, with Peter Galbraith, the United States Ambassador to Croatia 
 
20  The EA envisaged the opening of the Zagreb-Belgrade highway which passed through Serb-held territory 
in Western Slavonia, the repair of the oil pipeline running through the Krajina, the re-opening of the 
railroad through Western Slavonia and the repair of the water system in the same area. 
21  United Nations Task Force to Establish the Transitional Administration in Sector East, Background Report 
on the Region of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium, Zagreb, December 1995, para 58, p.13. 
22  As per Security Council Resolution S/1995/981 of 31 March 1995. 
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as mediator.23 Croatian officials made public pronouncements that, if an accord on the region 
was not reached by 30 November 1995 or prior to the completion of the simultanous Dayton 
peace talks, other "necessary" means could well be used to reintegrate the region. This sense 
of urgency was further compounded by President Tudjman’s announcement that Croatia 
would not renew UNCRO’s mandate.24 The threat of a third Croatian military offensive 
against the Serbs in Eastern Slavonia, accompanied by the realisation that no military support 
could be expected from Belgrade, paved the way for a political settlement.25 After days of 
intense negotiations, chaired by Peter Galbraith and the UN Special Envoy Thorvald 
Stoltenberg, the Basic Agreement26 calling for a transitional administration as well as an 
international force to be deployed in Eastern Slavonia was signed between the Croatian 
Government and the local Serb authorities on 12 November 1995. 27  
  
1.2.2 The Basic Agreement  
 
With the Basic Agreement on the Region of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western 
Sirmium, the UN Security Council was asked to establish a transitional administration, which 
should "govern the region in the interest of all persons resident in or returning to the region",28 
as well as to deploy an international force during the transitional period to maintain peace and 
security in the region.29 A transitional period of 12 months was envisaged with the optional 
extension of another period of the same duration if requested by one of the parties.30 The UN 
Security Council reserved its right to reconsider the mandate of UNTAES, if it received a re-
port from the Secretary General that the parties had significantly failed to comply with their 
obligations under the agreement.31 The main objective of the UNTAES was to reintegrate the 
                                                 
23  This resulted in the formulation of principles to guide further negotiations on the future of the region. 
24  United Nations Task Force to Establish the Transitional Administration in Sector East, Background Report 
on the Region of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium, Zagreb, December 1995, para 71, p.16. 
25  The Prospects for Eastern Croatia: The Significance of the UN’s Undiscovered Mission, Jacques Paul 
Klein, in: RUSI Journal, April 1997, p.20.   
26  This was a considerably less detailed version of earlier drafts. 
27  The Agreement was signed in Erdut by Milan Milanovic, Head of the Serb Negotiating Delegation; Hrvoje 
Sarinic, Head of the Croatian Government Delegation; Peter W. Galbraith, United States Ambassador and 
Thorvald Stoltenberg, United Nations Mediator.  
28  Basic Agreement on the Region of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium, signed on 12 
November 1995, S/1995/951 (annex), para 2, page 1. Thereafter Basic Agreement. 
29  Basic Agreement, para 3, p.1. 
30  Ibid., para 1, p.1. 
31  United Nations Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium, Published 
by United Nations Department of Public Information, DPI/1823, 96 13041, June 1996, Backgrounder: 
Steps leading to UNTAES, (c) Security Council Adopts Resolution 1037 (1996): Basic Agreement Enters 
Into Force, p.3. 
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region, demilitarised and secure, into the legal and constitutional system of the Republic of 
Croatia.32 The principal elements of the agreement are: 
 
• the demilitarisation of the region to be completed 30 days after UNTAES’ 
deployment 
• establishment and training of a temporary police force 
• observance of human rights 
• election to local bodies 
• recognition of the right to return for those originally from the area, and the right to 
stay for those currently living there 
• and normal functioning of all public services.33  
 
 
In general, the UNTAES was to build confidence and contribute to the peace process in the 
region. Activities such as the sectoral policy review, reviving agriculture, industry and 
local/regional/external trade links, human resources and labour market development, banking 
and financial services, advisory services, local managerial capacity building and training were 
clearly outside the mandate of the UNTAES.34  
 
1.3 Brcko - A microcosm of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
 
The Brcko area is situated in a low-lying valley along the Sava River in northern Bosnia 
and Herzegovina near a nexus of the current borders between the Republic of Croatia and the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Brcko town is located along the Sava River in the 
northernmost corner of the area. Historically, the area has represented a cross roads between 
peoples and empires.35 As a result, the area has been the home to a mix of Serb, Croat, 
Bosnian and other ethnic groups, Orthodox Christian, Catholic, and ‘Muslim‘ religions, and 
                                                 
32  UN-Security Council Resolution, S/1996/1037, 15 January 1996. The general nature of the Basic 
Agreement had led to different interpretations by the two parties. The Serbs read the omission of 
reintegration literally, and insisted that the future status of the region was still an open issue to be 
determined by a referendum at the end of the transitional period. The Croats on the other hand saw the 
Agreement as an instrument enabling swift, peaceful reintegration of the region into Croatia. In fact, the 
Agreement does not state literally that the region would be brought back under the control of the Republic 
of Croatia. However, the Security Council resolution S/RES/1025(1995) of 30 November 1995 does 
reaffirm that the region is an integral part of the country. See: United Nations Task Force to Establish the 
Transitional Administration in Sector East, Background Report on the Region of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja 
and Western Sirmium, Zagreb, December 1995, para 75, p.17. 
33  Basic Agreement, paras 3-13. 
34  United Nations Transitional Administration (UNTA) for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja  and Western Sirmium, 
unpublished paper of the UN, 21 December 1995, para 42, p.12. 
35  In 1699, following the conclusion of the Treaty of Karlowitz, the Sava River became the border between 
the Ottoman and Habsburg empires. For the next two centuries, Brcko represented the western-most reach 
of the Ottoman Empire. In 1878, at the Congress of Berlin, Austria-Hungary was allowed to occupy Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, which, however, remained under Ottoman sovereignty until 1908, when this too was 
assumed by Austria-Hungary.  
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European and Eastern cultures for centuries. Especially Brcko town is known for its multi-
ethnicity.  
In 1894, a railroad bridge over the River was built, which was complemented with the 
construction of the port in 1964. The Brcko area developed as both an agricultural and - 
because of its proximity to the Sava River and its link to the Tuzla Basin - transportation 
center for wood, coal, anthracite, agricultural/animal products and chemicals. With a current 
rate of 80%, unemployment is higher in Brcko than the average throughout the remainder of 
the Republika Srpska (RS).  
When hostilities erupted between Croatia and Serbia in 1991, the town of Brcko, which 
housed a Yugoslav National Army (YNA) barrack, immediately found itself near the center of 
the conflict. In late 1991 Serb para-military troops arrived in Brcko and began to train local 
Serb volunteers. At the same time, the YNA confiscated weapons from the Bosnian 
Territorial Defence Force in Brcko. In April 1992, Serb forces - composed of YNA regular 
and irregular forces - began their assault on Brcko and destroyed the road and rail bridges 
over the Sava River. The Serb forces encountered limited resistance in the town. After six 
days of fighting Serb forces had taken control of Brcko and the area extending several 
kilometres south and west of the town.36  
 
1.3.1 Towards a solution for the Brcko District 
 
When the Dayton Conference ended the Bosnian war in November 1995, the fate of the 
strategically important municipality of Brcko was left unresolved. Based on the fact that the 
Serbs controlled some 48%37 of the territory, including Brcko town, and the remainder of 
52% was left to the other two peoples, both of Bosnia’s newly formed entities (the Republika 
Srpska (RS) and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina) claimed the entire municipality. 
During the peace negotiations, all parties agreed that the decision as to where to place 
responsibility for the future governance of Brcko would be left to international arbitration, 
with a final decision to be made in a year.38 The area under dispute and subject to arbitration 
was understood to consist of the Brcko town in the RS and the Zone of Seperation (Inter-
Entity Boundary Line), forming a narrow but strategic corridor because it links the east and 
west halves of the boomerang-shaped Serb entity. The southern, more rural portion of the 
                                                 
36  Arbitral Tribunal for the Dispute over Inter-Entity Boundary in Brcko Area, Republika Srpska vs. the Fede-
ration of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Award, Rome, 14 February 1997, para 49, p.15. Hereinafter Award. 
37  Representing an area of 225 square kilometres of the territory. The remainder under control of the 
Federation represented 239 square kilometres. 
38  General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina signed in Paris on 14 December 
1995, Annex 2, Article 5, para 5.  
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municipality was left under Federation control and was not meant to be part of the arbitration 
process. Given the continuing failures to comply with the Dayton Accords in the RS area of 
the Brcko municipality, and the high levels of tension resulting therefrom, the international 
community decided to undertake a role in devising a detailed implementation strategy. 
Consequently, the first Tribunal’s Award of 14 February 1997 called for an International Su-
pervisory Regime, which was established by the Sarajevo Office of the High Representative 
(OHR). In March 1997 U.S. Ambassador Robert W. Farrand was selected to serve as the In-
ternational Supervisor of Brcko.39 
According to the first Award, in order to retain control of the strategic corridor, RS and 
local government officials were obliged to make significant progress in terms of returns of 
displaced Bosniacs and Croats to their pre-war homes and to show vigorous support for the 
envisaged town’s multi-ethnic administration. Throughout 1997, officials of the RS - in 
flagrant violation of the Dayton Accords - stubbornly resisted all efforts by the Supervisor and 
the Federation to achieve the first Award’s principal objectives. To give the leadership a 
chance to accomplish significant reforms, the status quo under International Supervision was 
maintained with the Supplemental Award in March 1998, pending a final arbitration phase to 
take place at the end of 1998 or early 1999. On 5 March 1999, Roberts B. Owen, the presiding 
arbitrator of the three-member Arbitral Tribunal issued the Final Brcko Award.40 
Notwithstanding the good intensions of RS Prime Minister Milorad Dodik, Owen, citing the 
near total failure of entity leaders to support minority returns and the multi-ethnic 
administration, concluded that Brcko should be governed neither by the RS nor by the 
Federation. Instead, the entire pre-war municipality was incorporated as a unified multi-ethnic 
"District" of Bosnia and Herzegovina under the enhanced powers of the International 
Supervisor of Brcko and his Office of the High Representative-North (OHR-North). 
Therefore, each entity was to delegate all of its powers of governance within the Brcko 
municipality to the new "multi-ethnic democratic government", which was to be known as 
                                                 
39  Arbitral Tribunal for the Dispute over Inter-Entity Boundary in Brcko Area, Republika Srpska vs. the Fede 
ration of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Supplemental Award, 15 March 1998, para 4 (a). Hereinafter 
Supplemental Award. 
40  After the two party-appointed Arbitrators failed to appoint a third Arbitrator within the required time, the 
President of the International Court of Justice, on 15 July 1996, appointed Roberts B. Owen as third 
Arbitrator and Presiding Officer of the Brcko Tribunal. As noted in paragraph 5 of the Award of 14 
February 1997, the parties have agreed to modify the applied UNCITRAL Rules in order to provide that if 
a majority decision of the Tribunal is not reached, the decision of the Presiding Arbitrator will be final and 
binding upon both parties. Such an agreement was in fact a virtual necessity in this particular case: From 
the outset the positions of the two parties on its merits have been polar opposites and each party has 
explicitly refused to compromise. It was observed that both party-appointed Arbitrators encountered 
significant difficulties in conducting themselves with the usual degree of detachment and independence. 
However, both party-appointed Arbitrators refused to sign any Award.     
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"The Brcko District of Bosnia and Herzegovina", under the exclusive sovereignty of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina.41   
 
1.3.2 The Final Arbitration Award 
 
The International Supervisory Regime draws its authority from the Awards derived 
from Annex 2, Article V of the Dayton Accords. Hence, the function of the International Su-
pervisor is to supervise the Dayton implementation throughout the Brcko area, subject to arbi-
tration.42 The Tribunal defines the Dayton Accord’s objectives as:  
• encouraging and enabling DPs and refugees to return to their pre-war homes 
• helping to develop democratic multi-ethnic institutions 
• ensuring freedom of movement 
• the conduct of free and fair local elections under OSCE43 supervision 
• and a unified police force operating under a single command, with complete 
 independence from police establishments of the two entities.44  
 
Given the significance of economic revitalisation, a concerted effort toward economic recon-
struction is considered essential to the reduction of ethnic and other tensions in the Brcko 
area. The Supervisor is therefore supposed to assist the various international agencies in 
developing and implementing a targeted economic revitalisation program.45 
With the Final Award all parties have agreed that the Supervisory regime must continue 
to exist, and that the authority and the responsibilities of the Supervisor must now be 
expanded geographically. Supervision is to continue until terminated by the Steering Board of 
the Peace Implementation Council.46 The Supervisor is to have the responsibility to effect 
coordination among the goverments of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the two entities, and the 
District.47 The basic concept is to create a single, unitary multi-ethnic democratic government 
to exercise those powers previously exercised by the two entities and the three municipal 
governments. Thus, the Supervisor is to promote the re-integration of the municipality’s 
parallel and overlapping political, economic and social institutions of the three ethnic groups. 
His foremost new task is to prepare a "Statute of the District Government" and a detailed plan 
and schedule for the formation of the District Government.48 Furthermore, he is to make the 
                                                 
41  Arbitral Tribunal for the Dispute over Inter-Entity Boundary in Brcko Area, Republika Srpska vs. the Fede-
ration of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Final Award, 5 March 1999, page 6, para 9. Hereinafter Final Award. 
42  Award, Rome, 14 February 1997, VII. Award, I.B, p.40. 
43  Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe. 
44  Final Award, 5 March 1999, para 6-36, p.5-10. 
45  Award, Rome, 14 February 1997, VII. Award, I.B(6), p.41. 
46  Final Award, 5 March 1999, para 37, p.10. 
47  Ibid., para 43, p.11. 
48  Ibid., para 38, p.10. 
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initial appointments of (a) members for a joint implementation commission to assist him in 
the drafting of the District Statute (b) the members of the District Judiciary and the 
Prosecutor, as well as (c) a three-member commission with responsibility for proposing 
modifications of existing laws to produce a uniform system of law throughout the District. 
Such appointments are to be in accordance with any "ethnic formula" specified in the new 
District Statute. The Statute is furthermore to specify the structure of the District Police 
Department and is to provide for continuing United Nations International Police Task Force 
(IPTF)49 guidance. In addition, it is to provide for the establishment of a District Customs 
Service which shall, in accordance with current practice, collect duties at the border. 
Furthermore, the Supervisor is to make provision in the Statute for an appropriate system of 
taxation within the District. The envisaged timeframe for the implementation of much what is 
included in the Final Award is the end of the year 1999.50   
The Brcko Tribunal is to remain in existence until such time as the Supervisor, with the 
approval of the High Representative, has notified the Tribunal (a) that the two entities have 
fully complied with their obligations to facilitate the establishment of the new institutions, and 
(b) that such institutions are functioning, effectively and apparently permanently, within the 
Brcko municipality.  
The Tribunal noted that there is reason to believe that, as displaced persons (DPs) from 
both entities increasingly return to their home, there will be a dilusion of hard-line 
nationalistic attitudes in both entities, thus reducing tensions overall in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina.  The incentive is that Brcko becomes an example of the ideals the international 
community seeks to nurture in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BH) and the region.51 On 19 August 
1999, the Brcko Superviser Robert Farrand offered the vision in a press conference on the 
Annex to the Final Award that Brcko, as "the mother of all hope", will become the most 
progressive, prosperous and ethnically mixed community in BH.52  
                                                 
49  Annex 11 of the Dayton Accords requires the IPTF to assist the governments of the entities in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina by providing training and monitoring services to the police forces, and to assist with the 
restructuring of both the police and criminal justice systems.  
50  Press Conference by Principal Deputy High Representative Ralph Johnson and Deputy High Representative 
and Brcko Supervisor Robert Farrand on the Annex to the Brcko Award, Coalition Press Information 
Center Sarajevo, 19 August 1999, http://www.ohr.int/press/b990819a.htm. 
51  Brcko Implementation Projects in Support of the March 5, 1999 Brcko Final Arbitration Award, Prepared 
for the May 20-21, 1999 Donors’ Conference for Bosnia and Herzegovina, prepared by Ambassador Robert 
W. Farrand, Deputy High Representative and International Supervisor of Brcko, OHR-North, page 3.   
52  Press Conference by Principal Deputy High Representative Ralph Johnson and Deputy High Representative 
and Brcko Supervisor Robert Farrand on the Annex to the Brcko Award, Coalition Press Information 
Center Sarajevo, 19 August 1999, http://www.ohr.int/press/b990819a.htm.  
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2. Means and resources 
 
2.1 Mostar - Costly ad hoc operation lacking political and military support 
 
While an Advance Party was laying the foundation in Mostar, the EU Member States 
nominated expatriate staff on the basis of proposals made by the German delegation, 
including a suggested allocation of posts between the then 12 Member States, as well as 
Switzerland, Sweden and Austria. There was no assessment of alternative candidates at the 
European Council level, nor was the Administrator able to influence the composition of his 
future team. The Advance Party submitted 28 separate reports to the European Council 
Presidency, many of which required written responses to practical questions, containing 
comment, guidance, advice or approval. The responses, however, were not forthcoming.53 
Furthermore, the arrival of the staff was not adequately coordinated with the Advance Party 
and resulted in logistical problems. For example, without informing the Administrator, two 
humanitarian advisors were sent to Mostar, one from the European Community Humanitarian 
Office (ECHO) and another from Denmark. The two worked in parallel for three months until 
the Administrator obtained the approval of the Council Presidency for the appointment of a 
single humanitarian coordinator from Denmark.  
The EUAM, including the Ombudsman’s Office, was then staffed by 39 expatriate civil 
staff (later increased up to 70), 6 additional staff provided by the European Community Moni-
toring Mission (ECMM), 300 local staff members, along with a Western European Union 
(WEU) police element eventually numbering 182 officers. In the end the following eight 
departments were set up: Finance and Taxes; City Administration; Economy and Transport 
Infrastructure; Reconstruction; Education and Culture; Cultural Life, Youth and Sports; 
Health and Social Services; as well as Public Order. The European expert heading each 
department cooperated with two local Co-Heads, one Croat and one Bosniac representative 
from the administrations in East and West Mostar, who were appointed by the Admnistrator 
and did not have any operational responsibility within the EUAM itself.54  
The WEU police element was to provide the EU Administrator with information and 
give advice on all aspects of the public order. The WEU was to "(...) seek to restore and 
maintain peace, confidence, and individual civil rights within the overall mandate of the 
EUAM"55. Furthermore, the WEU was to build a framework that would ensure a smooth tran-
                                                 
53  Official Journal of the European Communities, 96/C 287/01, Vol. 39, 30 September 1996, para 40, p.6. 
54  MoU, Article 9, para 3. 
55  From Division to Unity, Policy Document of the UPFM, Western European Union, 25 September 1994, 
Mostar.  
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sition of the Unified Police Force to local control when the WEU and the EU mandates would 
expire.56 Of the 182 international police officers promised by the WEU/EU-Member States, 
only 100 had arrived in Mostar by December 1994. The International Police Commissioner 
Col. Jan Meijvogel commented on this gap between resources and rhetoric by saying, "I am 
not able to drive in a car that only exists on paper".57 By March 1995 the WEU police element 
numbered 152 and, by July, 163 officers.  
A UN-Protection Force (UNPROFOR)-Liason officer was to inform and advise the 
EUAM about the military situation. Hence, the Administrator did not have control over 
UNPROFOR and was dependent on good relations with the troop Commander. When the 
IFOR troops, UNPROFOR’s successor after the Dayton Accords, arrived, its commander 
made clear that IFOR, which was under NATO command, would not fulfill a similar role to 
UNPROFOR. Furthermore, IFOR would not sign a Memorandum of Understanding with the 
EUAM because IFOR did not feel responsible for the political process within the Federation, 
especially not for Mostar. In principle, IFOR would respond to military elements of the Bos-
niac or Croat side only in case of  a direct threat.58  
According to the MoU, the EU-Administrator was to have the powers necessary to 
fulfill the mandate’s aims and principles while administering Mostar properly, efficiently and 
in correspondence with the views and wishes of the local parties and population. In exchange 
”the Receiving Party”59 affirmed its unrestricted commitment to support the EU-
Administrator in the exercise of his duties and to work cooperatively towards the achievement 
of the EUAM’s aims and principles.60 An Advisory Council, consisting of  5 Bosniacs, 5 
Croats and five representatives of other groups, of which 3 were Serbs, advised the 
Administrator in weekly meetings. After consulting with the Advisory Council and observing 
the Federation’s Constitution,61 the Administrator had the right to introduce regulations 
applicable in the area of the EU Administration if he deemed them necessary for the 
functioning of the EUAM or considered them in the interest of the Mostar city municipality.62 
                                                 
56  According to the MoU, Article 12, further details were to be laid out in a seperate document. 
57  Interview with Col. Jan Meijvogel, Police Commissioner, EU Administration, 29 November 1994, Mostar. 
58  Minutes of a meeting between Ambassador Klaus Metscher, Diplomatic Advisor to the EUAM, and IFOR 
Commander Leighton Smith, 14 January 1996, Mostar. 
59  The MoU disregards the actual division of the city of Mostar, speaking only of one receiving party instead 
of two, the Croats and the Bosniacs. 
60  MoU, Article 3.  
61  Article 10, Chapter IX, Part B, stipulates that the Constitution "(...) shall apply in the Municipality of the 
City of Mostar while it is under international administration, except as otherwise decided by the 
international administrator (...)".  
62  MoU, Article 10, para 3. 
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In daily practice, the Administrator was to cooperate with the Mayors of East and West 
Mostar, as well as a Serbian representative.  
Having been appointed by the European Council of Ministers, the European Admini-
strator had to follow the Council’s instructions as well as to report regularly.63 The Council 
reserved its right to replace the Administrator at any time during the period of 
implementation, after consultation with the Receiving Party.64 Responsible for the actual 
implementation of Joint Actions, such as the EUAM, was the six-monthly rotating Council 
Presidency, assisted by an Advisory Working Party of Member States Representatives, and in 
association with the Commission. Accordingly, it decided upon practical orientations of the 
operation and determined the precise actions required to meet the needs identified by the 
EUAM-Administrator.65 Therefore, the European Council Presidency also decided upon the 
release of funds, one instalment at a time.66 
The EUAM budget of 1994 was made available by a previous Joint Action67 which was 
adapted and extended so that Euro 32 million out of an overall budget of Euro 48,3 million 
would also be used to provide initial support for the administration of the town of Mostar by 
the European Union.68 Out of the Euro 32 million, Euro 15 million were initially made up 
from the EU General Budget. The remaining Euro 17 million were provided by direct 
contribution from the Member States, assessed according to the General National Product 
(GNP) key. On 31 December 1994, a half year after the EUAM’s estyblishment, Euro 4,9 
million out of Euro 17 million owed by the Member States (representing 15,2% of EUAM’s 
budget) were still unpaid. The 1995 budget was set at Euro 80 million and was entirely 
financed from the EU General Budget. In the wake of budget revisions due to changes in the 
overall political situation in Mostar the three-stage procedure (based on Commission 
procedures normally applied to individual projects) adopted by the Council to transfer funds 
led to cash-flow problems.69 Finally, following a request from EUAM supported by the 
                                                 
63  Memorandum of Understanding on the European Union Administration of Mostar, 5 July 1994, Geneva, 
Article 7, para 3. 
64  MoU, Article 6. 
65  The Presidency was assisted by an Advisory Working Party of Member State Permanent Representatives 
and operated in association with the European Commission. In actuality, the Advisory Working Party acted 
as the de facto management body. TEU, Article J.11,1. 
66  Council Decision (94/308/CFSP) of 16 May 1994, para 2. 
67  This was meant for the convoying of humanitarian aid in Bosnia and Hezegovina, which could not be 
executed due to the continuing combat. Nonetheless, the EUAM was considered to be more important and 
wide-ranging. Council Decision (93/729/CFSP) of 8 November 1993. 
68  Council Decision (94/308/CFSP) of 16 May 1994, para 1.   
69  Interview with Klaus von Helldorff, Head of Finance and Taxes, EU Administration, 11 April 1995, 
Mostar. See also: Bericht zur Bewertung der gemeinsamen Aktion der Europäischen Union in Mostar, 
Generalsekretariat des Rates der Europäischen Union, SN 1735/97, p.17, IV, 4.  
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European Court of Auditors, it was decided to simplify procedures by regarding all three 
budget years (1994, 1995, 1996) as one continous project. Consequently, the 1996 budget 
amounted Euro 32 million was again entirely financed from the EU General Budget. Thus, the 
available budget increased within the period of two years to a total of Euro 144 million, 
amounting to nearly Euro 2 400 per person in Mostar. At an additional estimated indirect cost 
of nearly Euro 35 million, Euro 585 per Mostar inhabitant can be added to that sum. This 
represents an unusually high concentration of funds compared to other assistance programmes 
in the world.   
The only lever the EUAM had, was to withdraw the reconstruction funds. As a final 
option the Council of Ministers reserved the right to terminate the EUAM at any time if it 
deemed that there was substantial change in conditions or if any of the parties did not fulfill 
its obligations.70  
 
2.2 Eastern Slavonia - Carefully set up with strong executive and military powers 
 
Pending clarification by the Security Council on which organisation(s) would be re-
sponsible for running the Transitional Administration in Eastern Slavonia, it was suggested in 
December 1995 that the concept of an integrated structure be adopted in order to 
institutionalise inter-agency coordination by directly involving lead sectoral agencies, 
avoiding duplication, and ensuring a coherent arrangement approach under the 
Adminiatrator’s leadership. Given all the uncertainties, a preliminary implementation 
structure for the UNTAES was proposed, which would be flexible enough to accommodate 
review and adjustment to meet emerging needs.71 A coherent policy was to ensure cost-
effective staff allocation with short-term highly specialised expertise, especially in the areas 
of economics and law. The idea was to staff the office of the UN Transitional Administrator 
with international civil servants, specialised and technical staff seconded by UN Agencies 
(UNHCR, UNDO, UNESCO, WHO, FAO, DHA, UNV etc.), other international 
organisations, (EC, WB, EBRD, OSCE etc.), and interested governments (civil and military 
engineers/staff).72 Whenever possible local staff was supposed to be incorporated.73 The 
Administration comprised the Head Office in Vukovar and six Field Offices. Departments 
were established in the fields Civil Affairs, Legal Matters, Public Information, Politics, 
                                                 
70  MoU, Article 4, para 1.  
71  United Nations Transitional Administration (UNTA) for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja  and Western Sirmium, 
unpublished paper of the UN, 21 December 1995, para 4, p.1. 
72  Secondment, consultancies, sub-contracting and other institutionally acceptable ad hoc arrangements were 
to be explored. Ibid., 21 December 1995, para 45, p.13. 
73  Ibid., para 46, p.13. 
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Administration, Military Issues, Elections and Border Monitoring.74 UNTAES personnel was 
build up to 455 civilian and 771 local staff, 5000 troops, 100 military observers, and 405 
civilian police officers.75 Through the liaison function of offices in Zagreb and Belgrade, the 
support of  authorities was sustained to exert significant influence on the local decision-
making process.  
With the aim of keeping the structure of the UNTAES office simple, centralised and 
streamlined,76 the governing structure was based on three mutually supporting pillars: the 
Transitional Administrator, the Administration Council and the Joint Implementation 
Committees. The Transitional Administrator was the chair of all three, the centrepiece of the 
executive system, governing under the policy umbrella of the Administration Council and 
through an executive mechanism of interrelated Joint Implementation Committees. The 
Administration Council comprised representatives from the Croatian Government, local 
Croatian and Serb authorities, local minorities, and UNTAES Civil Affairs Officers. 
Membership also included representatives of the United States, the Russian Federation and 
the European Union, in order to gain the necessary international political support. The Joint 
Implementation Committees (JIC) were to be chaired by a member of the Office of the 
Transitional Administrator and covered fields such as law enforcement, civil administration, 
public services, education and culture, return of refugees and DPs, health, human rights, 
elections, infrastructure and agriculture. Because the main issues facing the Administration 
were perceived as cross-sectoral and often multi-disciplinary, the JICs were to monitor the 
implementation of the agreement, to ensure integration of executive functions, to investigate 
allegations of violations, to adopt appropriate recommendations, to arbitrate disputes, and to 
coordinate and interface between sectors.77 The chairman of each committee was to report on 
recommendations including the operational mechanisms and policy guidelines and to keep the 
Committee focused on the progressive establishment of ethnically balanced representation of 
governing bodies, aimed at strengthening local institutions.78      
The Basic Agreement for the UNTAES states that the Transitional Administrator would 
be appointed to govern the region of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium in the 
                                                 
74  They were established in Vukovar, Vinkovci, Ilok, Beli Manastir, Osijek and Erdut. 
75  Figures taken from: UNTAES - An After-Action Report, 15 January 1996 - 15 January 1998, Christopher 
Holshek.   
76  United Nations Transitional Administration (UNTA) for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja  and Western Sirmium, 
unpublished paper of the UN, 21 December 1995, para 7, p.2. 
77  Ibid., para 29, p.7. 
78  Ibid., para 9, p.2. 
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interest of all persons resident in or returning to the region.79 The opinions of the parties were 
to be sought from the preparatory phase, in which a consensus was desirable, but not 
essential, since the Administrator had the decisive vote. The concept of ‘governing’ was 
perceived as crucial for setting the stage for a credible Administration and for preventing in-
terference during the implementation period. Thus, a firm governing style with clear 
executive powers was envisaged.80 Consequently, the Security Council Resolution 1037 gave 
the Transitional Administrator overall authority over the civilian and military components of 
UNTAES.81 In addition, strong international backing was seen indispensable to the 
implementation of the mandate, with a credible international force as its necessary 
manifestation.82 The Force Commander, the Police Commissioner, and the Chief 
Administrative Officer were to report to the Transitional Administrator, who in turn reported 
directly to the UN Secretary General and to the UN Security Council.  
The UN Force Commander had determined that the robust force of 9,000 plus, both in 
terms of quantity and quality, was required to accomplish the military aspects of the Basic 
Agreement.83 The Croatian leadership in its public pronouncements had indicated that a small 
force would be preferred, arguing that anything larger would delay the implementation 
process. Then, the UNTAES military deployment was increased from 1,600 troops at the end 
of the UNCRO mission in January 1996 to almost 5,000 combat troops, support units and 100 
UN Military Observers (UNMOs) in May.84 Mechanised infantry battalions from Belgium, 
Russia, Pakistan, Jordan and Argentina maintained specific areas of responsibility, supported 
by an Ukrainian light infantry group, a Slovakian engeneering battalion and a Polish Special 
Unit as a rapid reaction force and a back-up to the Transitional Police Force. According to 
Security Council Resolution 1037 of 15 January 1996 the UNTAES forces acted under the 
                                                 
79  Basic Agreement on the Region of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Sirmium, Erdut on 12 
November 1995, para 2. 
80  An example of drastic action in exercising executive authority was to be the temporary replacement of local 
mayors and/or police chiefs by international staff, pending local elections. See: United Nations Transitional 
Administration (UNTA) for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja  and Western Sirmium, unpublished paper of the 
UN, 21 December 1995, para 2 and 3, p.1.  
81  S/1996/1037 of 15 January 1996, para 2. 
82  Statement made by the Transitional Administrator Jacques Paul Klein when he was on a visit to Croatia and 
Serbia in December 1995. See: Jacques Paul Klein, My Visit to Croatia and Serbia, December 28-31, 1995, 
Report to the Secretary General of the United Nations, 5 January 1996, p.1. 
83  Three kinds of force sizes have been under consideration: a small force of about 2,000 troops, similar to the 
force which was on the ground in Eastern Slavonia, presumably unable to achieve the Agreement’s 
objectives; a heavily armed medium-sized force of 4,500, able to monitor and report on a demilitarisation 
process that would largely have to be carried out by the parties themselves; and a robust force of about 
9,000, which would have been able to carry out the demilitarisation on its own, regardless of the extent to 
which the parties cooperated. 
84  Backed by 34 tanks, 204 armoured vehicles, 21 mortars, six pieces of artillery, six assault and six transport 
helicopters.  
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provisions of Chapter VII of the UN Charter and were allowed to take military action to en-
sure the security and freedom of movement of the UN-peace-keeping operation personnel in 
the Republic of Croatia. This was a special arrangement, as peace-keeping operations are 
generally executed under Chapter VI, relying on the consent of all major parties. Here, 
learning lessons from the poor performance of the UNPROFOR as well as UNCRO, the 
forces had the coercive powers of a peace enforcement operation, although the consent of the 
involved parties could be derived from the Basic Agreement.85 Coordination between the 
Administrator and his military force was institutionalised with the force’s representation in 
both the Administrative Council and the Joint Implementation Committees. UNTAES and 
International Force Headquarters were co-located.  
Furthermore, UNTAES established close links with IFOR86 on the use of NATO air 
power. In the event of any significant military threat to the region that could not be dealt with 
by the UNTAES Force, IFOR could provide quick and close air or contingency extraction 
support. To ensure maximum coordination as required, a NATO air and an IFOR liason cell 
were located in UNTAES Headquarters.  
A Transitional Police Force (TPF) was to be established, reflecting the ethnic composi-
tion as it existed prior to the war and to providing a framework for law and order for residents 
and returnees. The UN-civilian police (UNCIVPOL) was in charge of operational tasks, such 
as the investigation as well as training of the TPF, this was to ensure a homogeneous 
background (regional concept, e.g. Commonwealth or Nordic police).87 The UNCIVPOL mo-
nitors did not have executive police functions, were unarmed and consequently did not have 
the power to arrest. They were only to conduct investigations and patrols.88 
The UNTAES did not have an operational budget. Therefore, the Administrator initiated 
two Donors Conferences. The biggest donors were the European Union and USAID. The EU 
signed a contract with UNTAES on conditionalities for the expenditure of the pledges and 
deployed a Principal Adviser for coordination in the UNTAES Headoffice.89 About US$ 400 
million were provided for the deployment of the troops, military observers, civilian police, 
                                                 
85  Defence Research Paper, Major Julien Neel, Belgian Army, Introduction, p.1.  
86  These links were retained when IFOR handed over to its successor, the Stabilisation Force (SFOR) in 
December 1996.  
87  United Nations Transitional Administration (UNTA) for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja  and Western Sirmium, 
unpublished paper of the UN, 21 December 1995, para 44, P.13. 
88  United Nations Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium, Published 
by the United Nations Department of Public Information, DPI/1823, 96 13041, June 1996, Backgrounder: 
Steps leading to UNTAES, (c) Security Council Adopts Resolution 1037 (1996): Basic Agreement Enters 
Into Force, p.3. 
89  Interview with Didier Fau, Deputy High Representative for Economical Reconstruction, Office of the High 
Repreesntative, 5 July 1999, Sarajevo. 
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civilian international and local staff. Reimbursement was also included for 8 Ukrainian go-
vernment-provided helicopters and for  the maintenance and operation of 974 UN vehicles 
and 2,340 contingent-owned vehicles.90   
Before the UNTAES was established, the designated Transitional Administrator 
Jacques Klein visited the region from 28-31 December 1995. Although both receiving sides 
had promised support during the vistit, he understood that the Presidents of Croatia and 
Serbia, Tudjman and Milosevic, differed on how quickly reintegration should occur.91 Klein 
had found the local Serbs traumatized by their defeat in the Krajina and resigned to a future 
within the Croatian state. Nevertheless, he had left no doubt that lack of cooperation, 
particularly with voluntary demilitarisation, would lead to a withdrawal of the United Nations, 
leaving the Serbs perilously exposed to a further offensive by the Croatian army and the 
strong possibility of complete expulsion.92 
 
2.3 Brcko - No money, ‘no nothing’ 
 
The OHR-North office numbers 26 international and 71 local staff members with the 
following departments: Front Office, Political, Media, Legal, Human Rights, Returns, Eco-
nomy, Admin/Finance and SFOR Liaison. Reporting to the Sarajevo Head Office is done by 
the departments and the Front Office. The Supervisor reports to the Arbitrator every six 
weeks. Administratively and budgetwise the Supervisor’s office is an integral part of the OHR 
structure. In contrast, it derives its mandate from the Tribunal’s Awards. Consequently, if 
OHR Head Office does not agree with the Supervisor’s implementation plan for Brcko it can 
intervene with reduction of resources, e.g. budget or staff. This structural inconsistency 
originates from different mandatory sources of the OHR-North office and the OHR Head 
Office. Therefore, also known as the Dayton Accord Annex 2 (Brcko arbitration) vs. Annex 
10 (general OHR mandate) debate.  
In coordination with the High Representative, the Supervisor has the authority to for-
mulate binding regulations and orders to assist the implementation programme and local de-
mocratisation. Such regulations and orders are to prevail against any law that runs contrary to 
                                                 
90  United Nations Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium, Published 
by the United Nations Department of Public Information, DPI/1823, 96 13041, June 1996, UNTAES 
Composition & Financing, fact sheet 8.  
91     Slobodan Milosevic, the President of Serbia, nominated his Foreign Minister as interlocutor for further  
        detailed communication with the Transitional Administration. This was seen as a clear sign that he 
        considered Eastern Slavonia as part of Croatia. See: Jacques Paul Klein, My Visit to Croatia and Serbia, 
         December 28-31, 1995, Report to the Secretary General of the United Nations, 5 January 1996, p.2. 
92  Jacques Paul Klein, My Visit to Croatia and Serbia, December 28-31, 1995, Report to the Secretary 
General of the United Nations, 5 January 1996, p.1.  
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the supervision mandate. All relevant authorities, including courts and police personnel, are to 
obey and enforce all Supervisory regulations and orders.93 According to the Final Award, all 
responsibility for overall coordination, and for issuing any needed directives to ensure that the 
entities fulfill their obligations with respect to the new District, is to be that of the Supervisor, 
who may delegate that responsibility to an appropriate Bosnia and Herzegovina institution. 
The entities were ordered to implement without delay any such directive, regulation or order 
issued by the Supervisor.94 
The Supervisory Regime does not have its own operational budget. The region is part of 
the international donors’ mechanism for the overall country. The Tribunal notes in the Final 
Award that financial support from international donors such as the EU, the World Bank, the 
United States, and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development will be 
particularly important in implementing the District plan, and they are respectfully urged to 
provide the Supervisor with all necessary support in his economic revitalisation efforts.95 
Project proposals requesting the sum of Euro 60 million for the implementation of the Final 
Award were prepared for the international donors conference in May 1999. However, no 
funds were pledged specifically for Brcko.  
Due to the countrywide deployment of the NATO led Stabilisation Force (SFOR), the 
successor to IFOR, the International Supervisory Regime in Brcko was not provided with its 
own forces and is therefore, like the EUAM in Mostar, dependent on good relations with 
SFOR.  
The Supervisor is to coordinate the International Police Task Force in close liaison with 
SFOR to provide services with two principal objectives in mind: (a) to ensure freedom of 
movement, through highway patrols and otherwise, for all vehicles and pedestrians on all 
significant roads, bridges and port facilities; (b) to ensure that relevant authorities will under-
take normal democratic policing functions and services for the protection of all citizens of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina within the affected area.96 For those functions IPTF in Brcko shall be 
staffed with 258 police monitors and advisors.97 
In the first Award of February 1997, the Tribunal gave notice that in the event of unsa-
tisfactory compliance among the parties with the Implementation of the Dayton Accords’ ob-
jectives, the Tribunal may conclude that the town of Brcko is to become a special district of 
                                                 
93  Award, Rome, 14 February 1997, VII. Award, I.B (1), p.40. 
94  Final Award, 5 March 1999, para 10, p.6. 
95  Ibid., para 49, p.12. 
96  Award, Rome, 14 February 1997, VII. Award, I.B (3), p.41. 
97  Report from the Brcko Supervisor Office of the High Representative North to the Steering Board in Sintra, 
30 May 1997, Introduction, p.1. 
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Bosnia and Herzegovina where the laws of Bosnia and Herzegovina and those promulgated 
by local authorities will be exclusively applicable.98 With the Supplemental Award of 15 
March 1998, the Tribunal pronounced that the political leaders of the Serbian Democratic 
Party (SDS), who were in power in the Republika Srpska (RS) throughout 1997, deliberately 
obstructed the Supervisor’s efforts to achieve the reforms required in the Dayton Accords. 
Consequently, the burden was put on the RS to persuade the Tribunal not to transfer Brcko to 
the Federation with the Final Award or implement the Tribunal’s earlier proposal to turn the 
Brcko area into a democratically-governed neutral district over which neither entity would 
have exclusive control.99  
With the Final Award the neutral Brcko District was established and the entities were 
obliged to implement without delay the respective "final and binding" regulations, which 
could only have a chance of success with cooperative compliance by both entities. Serious 
non-compliance would therefore be subject to penalties imposed by supervisory order. 
Furthermore, the Tribunal would retain the authority to modify the Award in the event of 
serious non-compliance by either entitiy. Modification could include provisions for 
transferring the District entirely out of the territory of the non-complying entity and placing it 
within the exclusive control of the other.100 
  
3. Implementation achievements 
 
3.1 Mostar – Reunification aims versus reconstruction reality 
 
At the time the EUAM began its work, Mostar was strictly divided along the former 
confrontation line, into a 70% destroyed and Bosniac controlled East and the less damaged 
West, controlled by the Croats. The city was under sporadic shelling by the Serb forces from 
the mountains only 3 kilometers away.101 As a pre-condition for the establishment of the 
EUAM and after three weeks of difficult negotiations with both military commanders of the 
Croatian HVO and the Bosniac B&H Army in town, demilitarisation was carried out under 
the auspices of the Spanish UNPROFOR battalion. This transpired over night before the 
EUAM’s official inauguration on 23 July 1994.102 The battalion was then, along with the two 
                                                 
98  Award, Rome, 14 February 1997, VII. Award, II.B, p.42. 
99  Arbitral Tribunal for the Dispute over Inter-Entity Boundary in Brcko Area, Press Release, 15 March 1998, 
para 3. 
100  Final Award, 5 March 1999, para 65-68, p.15. 
101  This was a product of continuing warfare between the different parties until the substantial ceasefire in 
overall Bosnia and Herzegovina was reached in October 1995. 
102  Interview with Ambassador Klaus Metscher, Diplomatic Advisor to the EUAM, 28 November 1994, 
Mostar. 
 
 
 24 
 
 
seperate local police forces, in charge of observing the demilitarisation at check-points in the 
area of EUAM responsibility. Since the Unified Police Force was not operational at that stage 
and the mandate of UNPROFOR was weak, in that it only allowed UNPROFOR "(...) to use 
force to the minimum extent necessary and normally only in self-defence."103, the 
demilitarisation process was already undermined by April 1995.104  
During the first winter, the EUAM worked to "winterize" damaged residences. Due to 
various organisational problems caused by the local administrations, as well as to the lack of 
EUAM personnel, this programme focusing on the repair of 3,500 lightly damaged dwellings, 
was not conpleted until July 1995. The self-help principle was pursued with the Technisches 
Hilfswerk (THW) operating a building material procurement, warehousing and delivery 
service. In all, a total of 5,600 lightly damaged dwellings, 420 heavily destroyed houses and 
16 blocks of flats for about 30,000 beneficiaries have been reconstructed. 28 schools,105 eight 
kindergardens, eleven medical facilities and clinics, two old people’s homes, a youth centre, 
two hotels, the Public Archive, a theatre, a children’s library, a public library, five 
government offices, the railway station, the bus station, two court buildings, the Unified 
Police Headquarters building, three cemetaries, and a Bishop’s Ordinate have been rebuilt. 
Buildings that had been more than 70% damaged have been demolished. 
The question of the reconstruction of secondary schools was subject to a political deci-
sion about common education and free access to all schools for all pupils. According to the 
MoU the EUAM was intended to support an educational system with combined classes for all 
pupils, except in subjects like language, religion and history, due to the complexity of national 
cultural identities.106 Owing to the fact that responsibility for regulating the educational sector 
lay with the canton, the EUAM lacked a lever with which to realise its concept.  
Both universities in Mostar - the University of Mostar on the West side with approxi-
mately 4,500 students and the University Djemal Bijedic in the East with approximately 1,500 
students - claim to be the legal successor to the former University of Mostar. Notwithstanding 
the fact that the city is far too small for two universities, the EUAM has not reached its ob-
                                                 
103  United Nations, Security Council, Report of the Secretary General pursuant to Security Council Resolution 
721 (1991), S/23280, Annex II, Concept for a United Nations peace-keeping operation in Yugoslavia, para 
4, p.15.  
104  Interview with Chris Jacobs, UNPROFOR Liason Officer, EU Administration of Mostar, 12 April 1995. 
105  The reconstruction of elementary schools for children up to the age of 14-15 years began at maximum 
speed, providing appropriate classrooms for about 12 000 children, who had been without education for 
two years. 
106  Strategy for EU Administration of Mostar, 13 May 1995, No. 69, p.16. 
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jective to re-establish a single university with free access for all students of the city and the 
region.107 
The health system collapsed during the beginning of the war. Since the health services 
had mainly been located on the West side, health organisation in East Mostar was conceived 
as a temporary emergency structure, when EUAM began its work. In the first phase the 
Department of Health executed a programme of data collection and planning as well as the 
execution of emergency intervention such as the restoration of war-damaged health structures, 
mainly on the East side, and public health measures, such as city cleaning and pest control, to 
reduce the risk of associated diseases. As the re-establishment of an unified health system for 
the entire city was the main objective of the EUAM, the repair of an important number of 
essential health facilities, the supply of basic hospital furniture and the supply and installation 
of medical equipment were some of its primary undertakings. The Administration has rebuilt 
eight Primary Health Care Centres and an Integrated Mother & Child Health Centre. Hospital 
capacity has been increased by adapting military barracks into a secondary hospital with 65 
beds for general surgery, internal medicine and psychiatry, as well as outpatient clinics. A 
Medical Centre for Continuing Education has been established for medical personnel. A 
project to complete and equip the Bijeli Brijeg central hospital in West Mostar was rejected in 
the absence of satisfactory guarantees regarding freedom of access and equality of treatment 
for all citizens. For that reason only war damage has been repaired. In the Social Services 
sector the EUAM has increased the capacity for accommodating homeless elderly people by 
building two residences with a joint capacity of 150 beds. The Administration has also helped 
traumatized victims of the war, chiefly women, children and the disabled elderly, with 
specific projects. 
After finishing an emergency programme of repair of the war damaged streets and traf-
fic lights, which represented the first visible signs of reconstruction, the EUAM established a 
local bus company. This became the only functioning joint enterprise project between East 
and West. The service was operated by two different agencies on each side with a common 
management board. An attempt to run a line crossing from one side to the other failed. In 
Mostar, the town of bridges, seven out eight had been destroyed during the fighting against 
the Serbs in 1992. The historical Ottoman ‘Stari Most’ (old footbridge) from 1566 was 
destroyed by the Croatian Army in November 1993. Five bridges across the river have been 
rebuilt. Since the municipal infrastructure projects were designed to serve both sides of the 
city equally and to lead to a ‘silent technical unification’ of Mostar, the opening of the 
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Carinski Bridge in April 1995 was a cornerstone. It was the first permanent bridge directly 
linking both sides of the town. Repairing the railway station of Mostar was the EUAM 
contribution to the reconstruction of the railway link between the Croatian port of Ploce and 
the Bosnian capital Sarajevo via Mostar, sponsored by the EU Member States. 
During the conflict water and electricity lines had been damaged in West Mostar, and in 
East Mostar supplies had been completely wiped out. Fundamental repairs were undertaken at 
the wells, reservoirs, lines and pumping stations in West Mostar so that water and electricity 
could be provided for the East. Progress was held up by the West’s attempt to use the con-
nection as a lever to gain control of the hydro-electric site Salakovac, which represents a main 
source of potential power for the region and, which was in the hands of the Bosniacs. In 
March 1995 homes, offices and schools in the whole town were once more regularly provided 
with electricity and water. However, the available power in the area was still insufficient for 
industry. A rubbish disposal site was installed in East Mostar alone because, the West had 
refused to establish a common one. EUAM has equipped two Public Work Agencies, which 
collect and dispose rubbish and survey public sewerage on their respective sides, with rubbish 
lorries and bins.      
Telecommunication links have been largely re-established. East Mostar had only seven 
operational telephone lines. EUAM created the technical preconditions to connect 7,000 
telephones. The switching capacity in the whole city was, at the end of the mandate, 20,000 
lines. The new system is designed with both sides able to operate on their own, taking into 
account the possibility of disconnection.  
In order to relaunch economic activities and to create jobs, support for local enterprises 
was a priority for the EUAM. Some 70 medium-sized companies and 400 small businesses, 
providing basic services like plumbing and electricity on both sides of the city, received 
financial support through two phases of a Small Enterprise Programme, of which the total 
amount was about DEM 8 million. The businesses received support in the form of small 
grants (average about DEM 16,000) and short term loans (average about DEM 6,000) for the 
reconstruction of the premises and the purchase of new equipment and machines. EUAM also 
initiated an Investment Support Programme for large public companies of the textile, 
concrete, construction-equipment and fruit-juice industries. Selection for both programmes 
was based on the criteria of job creation and the need for the products in Mostar. Despite 
some unavoidable shortcomings (political interference, lack of experience) the programme 
was relatively successful, providing about 3,000 employment opportunities. This was 
significant in the light of the fact that over 40% of the adult population was unemployed. In 
 27 
addition, training courses were organised for the staff of local companies of both sides in 
management, accounting and marketing. The aim here was "to assist in the transition from a 
former socialist economic system to a more liberal one which is expected and wanted by 
all"108. Some efforts have been undertaken to promote contacts between local industries and 
Western European companies and markets. Initiatives were launched at trade fairs, and 
contacts have been established with several European Chambers of Commerce. Three 
companies have started to export products like cigarettes, fruit-juice and compressors to 
France, Switzerland and Slovenia.109  
Mostar’s pre-war population was about 100,000, with Bosniacs and Croats nearly ba-
lanced and a sizeable Serbian minority of 19%. When the EUAM began to work in Mostar, 
the city had a population of about 62,000. Approximately 26,000 Mostaris had fled the city 
while an equal number of people had moved in, fleeing from other areas in Bosnia. Although 
according to the MoU, all persons who at the time of the 1991 census had their principal 
residence in Mostar have the right to return to the city,110 the question of repatriation of 
refugees and DPs could not be answered in Mostar alone. The main problem remained the 
lack of political will among all parties in Bosnia and Herzegovina to repatriate minorities. 
Consequently, instead of returning to their place of residence before the war, people wanted to 
stay in majority areas, so that they needed new accommodation in a country with widespread 
destruction. The repatriation of one family often forces another to vacate the returning 
family’s flat. Due to the resulting domino-effect, Mostar could not begin repatriation without 
the existence of an agreement on tenants’ and property rights applicable on all levels of the 
Federation. According to the Dayton Agreement the reciprocal return of a substantial number 
of displaced persons to both sides of Mostar city should have taken place immediately. The 
Croats pointed out that population movements should not lead to changes in the current 
ethnical balance. They also insisted, that Mostar’s particular problems with refugees should 
be placed in the context of the Federation.111 Nevertheless, a pilot project was launched with 
the aim to repatriate 50 families to each side of Mostar. Inspection of the 50 dwellings, 
selected by both Mayors, revealed that only a few on the West side were acceptable for the 
purpose of return due to occupation or heavy damage. The result of that pilot project was that 
in East Mostar former inhabitants could move back into 87 reconstructed apartments while 
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the West Mostar authorities led a boycott, not allowing Bosniacs to return.112 Until the end of 
EUAM’s mandate ten Croat families had returned to the East without security problems. Only 
a handful of family reunions between East and West could be accomplished. No Bosniac 
family returned to West Mostar although a survey revealed that 12,000 unoccupied flats were 
available. Despite the Decree on Stopping Expulsion from Houses and Apartments113 issued 
by the Administrator on 22 October 1994, eviction mainly of Bosniacs living in West Mostar 
continued and was often accompanied by threats or acts of violence. The local authorities 
seemed unable to take any action whatsoever. At times they even appeared to participate in 
the evictions.114 In March 1997, the time by which EUAM had already left Mostar, evictions 
of Bosniacs living in the Croat part of the town were still taking place.115  
Due to Croat resistance, freedom of movement was from the beginning a stumbling 
point beyond which no meaningful progress was made for one-and-a-half years. As a result, 
until December 1995, Mostar was practically a divided city. With the exception of military-
age men (between 16 and 60), in the entire history of the EUAM only 250 persons received 
permission to cross the former front line on a daily basis. A small number of people were able 
to obtain identity cards enabling them to cross to the other side for professional reasons. For 
security reasons the Croats constently objected to attempts to achieve further progress. They 
had no incentive to make any concessions, as they occupied the less-destroyed and better-in-
frastructured part of Mostar, which had free access to both Bosnia and Croatia. With the 
Dayton Accords in late 1995 the restrictions on numbers were lifted. Violent incidents during 
the first week of 1996, however, disrupted freedom of movement. After a diplomatic round 
sponsored by the Italian EU Presidency in Rome on 17/18 February, a policy of complete and 
unlimited freedom of movement for all citizens of Mostar was finally established on 20 Fe-
bruary 1996. Due to lasting fear of attacks by uncontrolled elements, there was still 
reluctance, particularly among men of military age, to cross over to the other side. 
A three-phase plan was to lead progressively to an autonomous unified police force 
(UPFM). Due to Croat security reservations only very slow progress was made toward the 
establishment of a Joint Operation Centre. After fruitful talks between the Administrator and 
high ranking diplomats of the Republic of Croatia and the Bosniac-Croat Federation, concur-
rent with the first anniversary of the Washington Agreement in March 1995, most of the ob-
                                                 
112  Interview with Amb. Bo Kälfors, Refugee Adviser, EU Administration of Mostar, 2 July 1996.  
113  The Decree declared all evictions by private people, by force or harassment of the existing occupants to be 
considered criminal acts subject to prosecution. 
114  Report on the Ad Hoc Group meeting on 10 December 1996, p.3. 
115  Official Journal of the European Communities, No C 85/148, 17 March 1997, 12. Former Yugoslavia and 
non-compliance with Dayton Agreements, Resolution on the situation in Mostar and Brcko. 
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jectives of the first phase had been achieved, but not the recruitment of local police officers. 
Although on 18 September 1995 an agreement on the implementation of Phase II was reached 
and signed by both the Mayors and Police Officers of Mostar East and West, no progress was 
achieved, due again to Croat objections.116 Concurrent with the Dayton peace talks Franjo 
Tudjman, the President of Croatia and the Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic reached an 
agreement to strengthen the Federation.117 The agreement included a plan to accelerate the 
political integration of Mostar, which was seen as a weak link. The goals of ensuring freedom 
of movement, holding free elections in the city and the establishment of joint police patrols 
were set forth. Some violent incidents in early January 1996, leading to the death of Croat and 
Bosniac police officers, underlined the problems the WEU had with the implementation of the 
joint patrols. At the summit in Rome on 17/18 February 1996, where the EU, together with 
the International Contact Group, met the Presidents of Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and 
Serbia, the local parties agreed to begin with the deployment of the joint patrols on 20 
February. To aid with the unification of the police force, the Croatian President Tudjman 
offered 100 police offers, and to balance those forces the Bosnian government also agreed to 
send 100 officers. The typical running patrol was now composed of two officers from the 
WEU, one Croat, one Bosniac, one Mostar Croat, one Mostar Bosniac, and one interpreter. 
With this composition, since their 20 February implementation, the joint forces have been 
functioning smoothly. In late April, in accordance with the Dayton Accords, the WEU opened 
the Joint Operation Centre. Although the final phase concerning transition and withdrawal 
was due to begin in March 1996 and end with the expiry of the EUAM’s mandate on 22 July 
1996, Phase II was still running as of the beginning of July 1996. In Phase III, after an 
intensive training programme for the local police officers, the WEU was to be withdrawn and 
control of the police force gradually handed over to the local officials. The UPFM should 
theoretically then have been able to continue the same independent and self-sufficient role of 
the EU Administration and the WEU police.  
Article 21 of the MoU provides that all funds at the disposal of the two local admini-
strations of Mostar East and West would be made available to the EUAM Department of 
Finance and Taxes, which would integrate them into the city’s budget. Even though the two 
administrations were receiving outside funds, they have never declared them to the EUAM. 
Concerning the unification of the city administration, the Interim City Statute published 
in the official Gazette of 7 February 1996 was an attempt to satisfy both the EUAM’s 
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objective of a unified government and the idea of dividing the city into ethnically based 
districts providing consideration for and protection of the individual cultural alignment.118 
From the very beginning of the political dialogue on the future status of Mostar in March 
1995, the Croat representatives insisted on two districts in a ‘unified city’, which in effect 
entails confirming the results of the war and a de facto division of Mostar. After long 
negotiations both sides agreed in Dayton to divide Mostar into three districts on each side. 
However, because they could not reach an agreement on the districts’ borders, the 
Administrator had to arbitrate. He introduced one neutral central zone containing federal, 
cantonal and city administrations. The Croats violently objected to his arbitration. They 
argued that the central zone, with a Bosniac majority, would favour the Bosniacs and would 
furthermore violate the Dayton Accords, in which only six districts were anticipated. 
Consequently, the Croats cancelled further collaboration with the EUAM. At the Rome 
summit in February 1996, the two Mostar Mayors agreed to a reduced central zone. That 
modified zone was only to contain buildings of common public interest, so as to constitute a 
core of integration between both sides, and was to be administered directly by the Mayor and 
the City Council. This outcome was endorsed by West Mostar’s Mayor Mijo Brajkovic, 
saying that the compromise was a victory of reason which showed that the Croats were right 
to have protested. Subsequently, Croat authorities have launched projects in the central zone 
contradicting the spirit of the Rome Agreement, in particular, they laid a foundation stone for 
a Catholic Basilica and planned to build a Croat war memorial. On 26 February EUAM 
Administrator Hans Koschnick resigned because he viewed the compromise of Rome, 
initiated by the Italian Presidency, as a reward for Croatian violence.     
Although the Mostar elections which, according the Dayton Accords were to be held 
‘no later than 31 May 1996’119, were viewed as a test case for the September countrywide 
elections to be supervised by the OSCE, the EU alone was responsible for the organisation in 
Mostar.120 The EUAM faced a major obstacle during the election preparations. The Croats 
and Bosniacs disagreed over the question who should be allowed to vote. The Croats conten-
ded that only those living in Mostar at the time of the elections could participate in them. The 
                                                 
118  The central administration of the city was to have certain powers, such as taxation, urban planning, water, 
electricity, and public transport. The competency of the districts was to guarantee participation of citizens 
in local self-government. The multi-ethnic city council was to have 48 members, half of them elected by 
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119  Dayton Agreement on Implementing the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina of 10 November 1995, 
Section II, I:2, p.8.  
120  The Interim Statute of the City of Mostar of 7 February 1996 included a Decree on the Conduction of the 
Elections defining the technical details for organising the elections for the city and district councils. 
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Bosniacs protested that the voting rules derived from the Dayton Accords would disenfran-
chise non-Croats who fled or were evicted from their homes in the Mostar area by Croat sepa-
ratists during the 1993 war. The Bosniac SDA Party complained that prohibiting the expelled 
citizens of Mostar from participating in the elections would be tantamount to a European lega-
lislation of the ethnic cleansing and division of the city and thus threatened a boycott. This 
disagreement led in mid-May to Bosniac non-participation in the organs for the election 
administrative bodies. The deadlock in the electoral process was finally overcome after a 
round of negotiations between the new Administrator Ricard Perez Casado and both Mostar 
Mayors, and President Izetbegovic and President Tudjman, which culminated on 25 May 
1996 in the signing of an agreement by all parties on the local level. This agreement allowed 
all Mostarians who were registered in the 1991 census and left the city involuntarily to 
participate in the elections. Thus, Mostar residents who fled abroad were allowed to vote 
either in Germany, Switzerland, Norway or Sweden. Furthermore, the Administrator 
postponed the elections until 30 June 1996.121  
The first post-war elections in BH proceeded more smoothly than expected, without any 
major incidents.122 The national parties of the Bosniacs and the Croats, SDA123 and HDZ124, 
won the elections, while the list of five opposition non-nationalistic and multi-ethnic parties 
was surprisingly weak.125 The pro-unification SDA, whose list included some Serbs and 
Croats in a coalition named ‘For a Unified Mostar’, won a landslide victory abroad, which in 
the final count helped the Bosniac ruling party to wield a narrow majority in the city 
council.126 After the official election results were announced, the Bosniac-Croat Joint Election 
Commission annuled the votes from the polling station in Bonn, Germany. This annulment 
was immediately followed by an ‘Objection’ submitted by East Mostar Mayor Safet Orucevic 
for the list of citizens ‘For a Unified Mostar’. The reason for their entire annulment was that 
26 extra ballots had been cast in the German capital.127 The Croat Commission members 
contested the election results and refused to confirm them. Although the extra votes hardly 
made a difference in the result of the Bonn vote, their entire annulment would have changed 
the overall result.  
                                                 
121  Agreement on the Local Election Commision, 25 May 1996.   
122  Freedom of movement and overall security was assured by the presence of more than 2,000 IFOR troops, 
so that voters could cross safely the former front lines by bus. 
123  Party of Democratic Action 
124  Croatian Democratic Union 
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On 6 July, the EUAM Ombudsman announced that the Mostar elections were valid and 
demanded that the Election Commission publish the results.128 In reaction the HDZ appealed 
to the federal Constitutional Court in Sarajevo to rule on the irregularities and refused to take 
up its wish to unite the three city districts with Croat majorities. Consequently, at the end of 
EUAM’s mandate on 23 July 1996 the city remained without an administration to which the 
EUAM could transfer control. After long negotiations involving US President Bill Clinton 
and Croatian President Franjo Tudjman, as well as talks by numerous European diplomats 
with Croatian Foreign Minister Mate Granic, the problem was solved with an agreement 
signed by both Mayors in August. Moreover, both accepted a Joint Action - nominating a 
Special Envoy for Mostar129 - already decided by the Council of Ministers on 15 July130 and 
assured their full cooperation concerning the establishment of a functional city administration. 
The two Mayors also took official note of the HDZ’s objections against the decision of the 
EU Ombudsman regarding the election results in the Bonn polling station and its subsequent 
complaint to the appropriate Court of the Federation. It was also stipulated that the Mayor was 
to be a Croat,131 taking into account that the governor of the Bosniac-led Neretva Canton and 
the Mayor of Mostar should be of different ethnic origin.   
 
3.2 Eastern Slavonia - Authoritative reintegration truth  
 
In the beginning of 1996, Eastern Slavonia was the base for approximately 10,000 
armed Soldiers of the "Army of the Republic of Serb Krajina (ARSK)" II Slavonia Baranja 
Corps.132 This conventional force was supplemented by three nationalist Serb para-military 
troops: the warlord Arkan’s Tiger Brigade, Dragan’s Red Berets, and Seselj’s White 
Eagles.133 UN sources estimate that Croatia had, in the immediate proximity of the region, a 
                                                 
128  According to Article 11 of the Decree on Conduct of Elections for the City Council the EUAM 
Ombudsman can overrule the decision if only one of the parties has lodged an official complaint. His 
conclusion was that any suspicion of double voting in Bonn was unfounded due to the random distribution 
of the additional ballots. The distribution of the ballots showed that the irregularity should be attributed to 
material errors committed in the procedure by the Polling Committee rather than to fraudulent intentions. 
129  To ensure the rapid reintegration of the city into an overall structure for peace implementation in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina by phasing out of the EU Administration, ending as soon as possible after 23 July and in 
any case not longer than 31 December 1996. 
130  Council Decision (96/442/CFSP) of 15 July 1996. The successor of the Administrator Hans Koschnick, the 
Spaniard Ricard Perez Casado, wrote in a report to the Council of Ministers already on 13 May 1996, that 
he was sure that Mostar will not have a democratically elected town government in the near future but will 
still be a divided city. What in his opinion was needed was an extension of the mandate.    
131  Following an official suggestion by a SDA of 10 July 1996 and already agreed to by Prime Minister 
Muratovic on 23 May 1996.  
132  The ARSK had in total about 15,000 regular troops, 120 tanks, 120 artillery pieces, 140 mortars and 11 
multiple-launch rocket systems (MLRS). 
133  These forces came partially from the local command structure and were deemed to be more disciplined than 
regular units.With an effective size of 300-500, the Tiger Brigade was the largest of the special forces. It 
 33 
total of 23,000 troops.134 Considering this high presence of local forces in the area, 
demilitarisation was not only perceived as the most crucial and difficult aspect of the 
UNTAES’s implementation package, but also as a pre-condition for the successful restoration 
of respect for the UN and the provision of a secure environment. Demilitarisation entailed the 
removal of Serb forces from the region; their replacement by a credible neutral force; the re-
introduction of the Croatian Army to the region without destabilising the area; and self-
repatriation of the International Force in phases.135 Thus, in May 1996 the demilitarisation 
process formally began, with the majority of ARSK tanks and heavy weapons handed over to 
the Federal Military in Serbia-Montenegro.136 The ARSK then disbanded and its former 
soldiers became civilians.137 By the 27th June, after some difficulties with para-military troops 
based in the Djeletovci oil fields were overcome, demilitarisation was declared complete and 
UNTAES was proclaimed as the sole military force in the region. To try to take as many of 
small arms as possible, held by almost every adult, out of circulation, UNTAES began a 
weapons buy-back programme in October 1996. In return for cash payments funded by the 
Croatian government around 10,000 rifles, 5,000 disposable and 600 reusable rocket 
launchers, 15,000 grenades, 7,000 antitank weapons and 2 million rounds of ammunition were 
handed into UNTAES collection points during that year.138 During demilitarisation the UN 
Military Observers’ (UNMOs) task was to report on the removal of equipment. Later, they 
were to continue to maintain liaisons with the Croatian military forces and special police in 
the Osijek and Vinkovci areas and to contribute to civilian tasks with the Civilian Affairs 
department, e.g. to monitor eight of the 25 UN Document Centers, which issued the full range 
                                                                                                                                                        
had evolved into a specially trained elite unit from its origins as a freelance, mercenary, para-military group 
and was used for training regular forces and volunteers from Serbia. Another important function was to 
discipline local troops and the civilian population. See: United Nations Task Force to Establish the 
Transitional Administration in Sector East, Background Report on the Region of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja 
and Western Sirmium, Zagreb, December 1995, para 37, p.10. 
134  Included in this configuration were two professional guards brigades, two professional ranger battalions, 
four home defence regiments and nine infantry regiments with 60 tanks and 240 pieces of artillery. These 
forces could potentially have been reinforced within 48 hours complemented by two machanised brigades 
and two artillery brigades, to give a total of 34,000 troops. Thus, the Croatian Army (HV) had significant 
flexibility and clear superiority in all elements over the "ARSK". See: United Nations Task Force to 
Establish the Transitional Administration in Sector East, Background Report on the Region of Eastern 
Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium, Zagreb, December 1995, para 37, p.10. 
135  United Nations Task Force to Establish the Transitional Administration in Sector East, Background Report 
on the Region of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium, Zagreb, December 1995, para 82, p.18. 
136  On 15 April, the Administrator signed the "Schedule and Procedures for the Demilitarisation of the Region 
of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium", laying out in detail the procedures and timetable for 
the demilitarisation of the area and the demobilisation of the personnel of the Serb armed forces. The local 
military and police commanders were obliged  to provide UNTAES with complete information regarding 
their units, weapons and equipment. 
137  UNTAES - An After-Action Report, 15 January 1996 - 15 January 1998, Christopher Holshek.  
138  UNTAES soldiers were authorised to disarm anyone openly carrying small arms and weapons, which have 
not been registered as ‘hunting’ rifles with the local authorities.  
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of Croatian documents necessary for voting to more than 90,000 people in the region. 
Furthermore, they worked on identifying vacant houses for possible returns, as well as  on 
monitoring the human rights situation. A de-mining programme was coordinated by 
UNTAES. Around 400-600 de-mining personnel were working at any one time in the region, 
clearing several thousand mines. According to estimates the work will take up to 10 years to 
complete. UNTAES has worked to promote international support for de-mining and attracted 
funding for this vital work from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR) and the European Union. 
A local police force based on a new concept and distinct from the para-military and 
infiltrated units that have been policing the region for the past four years was assumed to need 
training focusing on civilian issues. The concept of identifying a mixed group of local police 
officers for training abroad in a neutral environment was suggested to avoid the pressure of 
propaganda during their training and in preparation for the cooperative aspect of their future 
work. Consequently, a major initiative was the establishment of the Transitional Police Force 
(TPF) in July 1996, made up of 910 Serbs, 840 Croats and 50 members of other ethnic 
groups, to police the region in an even handed manner until Croatian control. UNCIVPOL 
provided the TPF with training and advice to help them operate to international standards. 
Along the region’s international borders, UNTAES border monitors helped the TPF and the 
Transitional Border Control Force to operate customs and immigration procedures to 
recognised standards. At the end of the period, a smooth hand-over and transition to a joint 
ethnically balanced local police was achieved. A Police Support Group of 136 international 
civilian police monitors remained to further observe the local police’s performance before this 
task was transfered to the OSCE police monitoring mission.  
Croatian local government officials were brought into the region to help prepare for the 
smooth transition of town and country administrations into the country’s governmental 
structures, reflecting Croat/Serb proportional representation on the basis of the 1997 voter 
registration lists. Croatian law was introduced in the region, while existing laws were phased 
out. School curriculum and qualifications have been harmonised and multilingual certificates 
issued. The pension system for old people and war widows has also been brought into line 
with those of Croatia. However, the functioning of local government remains incomplete in 
important financial and legal areas: most municipalities cannot provide basic communal 
services because they have not received sufficiant funds; only half of them have finalised 
plans for economic reconstruction; and the boundaries of the new municipalities drawn before 
the April 1997 elections have not been legally recognised, creating doubts as to their further 
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existance after the end of UNTAES. Postal, telecommunications, public utilities and banking 
regulations have been prepared for re-integration. Arrangements were made for 160,000 
people to cross the former frontline to meet with relatives and friends. A weekly market 
started in August 1996 on a road in the Zone of Seperation where some 150,000 people from 
all over former Yugoslavia have gathered to buy and sell goods or meet friends and relatives.  
Before 1991, Eastern Slavonia had been multi-ethnic, with Croats making up 45% of 
the population, Serbs 25% and other nationalities (Hungarians, Slovaks, Yugoslavs, Gypsies, 
Czechs, Ukrainians, Italians, Bosniacs, and Ruthenians) the remaining 30%. When UNTAES 
was established, about 85% of a population of approximately 140,000 people were Serbs, 
including 70,000 Serb refugees from other parts of former Yugoslavia,139 and 8% were Croats 
(between 10,000 and 13,500). 140 UNHCR was the lead agency on issues relating to the 
movement of population, whereas UNTAES played only a secondary role.141 Since Serb DPs 
who had escaped the Croatian military operations in May and August 1995 mainly occupied 
Croat houses, the return of Croat DPs to the region was complicated. Unless the Serbs were 
resettled, the Croats could not return home. The two-way return process had been held up by 
slow action of the governmental Office for DPs and Refugees, but also due to the uncertain 
security and economic situation as well as legal impediments to restoring property. Because 
of continued ethnic violence, harassment, and intimidation of Serbs inside the region by Croat 
extremists, often passively tolerated by the Croatian police, as well as the hostile propaganda 
in the Croatian media, the Serbs’ confidence about their future remained low. A country-wide 
public programme of national reconciliation has been adopted by the Government of Croatia 
in October 1997, as called for in Security Council resolution 1120 (1997).142 A few days later 
a multi-ethnic national Board for the Establishment of Confidence and Acceleration of 
Returns and Normalisation of Life was founded to implement the programme by working 
through regional, municipal and local reconciliation committees. The board remained inactive 
on all levels.143 UNTAES, for its part, has contributed to reconciliation by organising several 
professionel reconciliation and ‘conflict resolution’ seminars with international donor support. 
                                                 
139  Of which 5,000 were from Bosnia, 50,000 displaced persons (DPs) from Western Slavonia and 15,000 
from the Krajina. 
140  United Nations Task Force to Establish the Transitional Administration in Sector East, Background Report 
on the Region of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium, Zagreb, December 1995, para 10, p.4. 
141  United Nations Transitional Administration (UNTA) for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja  and Western Sirmium, 
unpublished paper of the UN, 21 December 1995, para 35, p.10. 
142  Report of the Secretary-General on the UNTAES, S/1997/767 of 2 October 1997, para 19, p.6. 
143  Report of the Secretary-General on the UN Police Support Group, S/1998/887 of 23 September 1998, para 
26, p.6. 
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Until the end of UNTAES’ mandate, some 6,000 Croats and 9,000 Serbs returned to their ori-
ginal homes.144 
UNTAES had established a pro-active public awareness campaign to get its message 
out to people who had previously been confronted with hate propaganda in the daily 
newspapers, television and radio. A bulletin was published every fortnight and daily 
television and radio programmes were broadcast from their own transmitters.145  
The Administrator had co-sponsored two international donor conferences that have 
raised US$ 45 million for the reconstruction of the region’s water supplies, telephone 
systems, electric power grid, agriculture, oil, industry, residential accommodation, police 
stations, roads, ports and schools. This work continues, with estimates suggesting some US$ 1 
billion is needed to get the region back on its feet economically. Some 5,000 work contracts 
in reintegrated public enterprises and institutions have been publicised, of which a third had 
been offered to Serbs.  
The work of UNTAES and its presence has served as a bridge for the mutual recogni-
tion of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). Relations between the two 
countries were normalised through increasingly cooperative bilateral agreements, including a 
"soft-border" regime and the reestablishment of normal commercial and traffic links. This is 
essential to the full economic development of the Danube border area. Already in May 1996 
the Zagreb-Belgrade highway was reopened, leading through UNTAES area. The same day 
the Adriatic pipeline from Croatia to the FRY was reconnected. Mail and telephone service 
was resumed a week later.  
On 13/14 April 1997 the political landscape of Eastern Slavonia was fundamentally 
transformed, as the region took part in Croatian town, country and parliamentary elections for 
the first time. The elections were an important milestone for the legitimate representation of 
the local population in the Croatian constitutional and legal system. Croatian and Serbian 
politicians and parties opposed each other in a free and fair election, co-ordinated and 
monitored by the UNTAES Electoral Unit. With the encouragement of UNTAES, the two 
main parties, the Croatian HDZ and the Independent Democratic Serb Party (SDSS) 
negotiated a power-sharing arrangement throughout the region.146 During the UNTAES 
mission local Croat officials have not always implemented the decisions of the central 
government and have on several occasions been uncooperative, using bureaucratic 
                                                 
144  Report of the Secretary-General on the UNTAES, S/1997/953 of 4 December 1997, para 6, p.2.   
145  Defence Research Paper, Major Julien Neel, Belgian Army, p.6-7.  
146  S/1997/487 of 23 June 1997, para 3, p.2. 
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manoeuvres and obstructions to delay or prevent promised support to the region. Therefore, 
UNTAES insisted on a mechanism to coordinate Croatian State activities in the region and to 
ensure that local politicians implemented national policies. Consequently, a State 
Commission147 was formed. Nevertheless, President Tudjman’s personal intervention was still 
required for more difficult issues.148  
When UNTAES left the region, international engagement was handed over to the 
OSCE, whose misssion was to monitor the Croatian Government’s compliance with human 
rights and other agreements.         
 
3.3 Brcko - Rocky road towards multi-ethnicity  
 
The area of responsibility of the International Supervisor was not demilitarised until the 
Final Award called for demilitarisation of the entire Brcko District. A plan for the closure of 
RS and Federation military bases and transfer of equipment and personnel is being developed 
under the guidance of SFOR.149  
Due to the fact that print media are not widely read by a population that is 15% illite-
rate, OHR North uses television to underscore and complement their messages about freedom 
of movement, right of return, elections, democratisation, and economic revitalisation. Further-
more, an aggressive and energetic public information campaign includes an OHR newsletter 
distributed on both sides of the Inter-Entity Boundary Line (IEBL) as well as radio 
programmes.  
In 1991, the popuation of the Brcko municipality was about 87,000 of which 44% were 
Bosniacs, 21% were Serbs, 25% were Croats, and 10% designated themselves as belonging to 
some "other" ethnic group. Brcko town had around 41,000 inhabitants, of which 56% were 
Bosniacs, 20% were Serbs, 7% were Croats, and 17% declared themselves as others.150 
According to the Award of 14 February 1997, it was estimated that 35,000 people live in 
Brcko town, and that of this number 34,000 were Serbs. Of the Serb population, 
approximately 8,000 were pre-war residents who remained there; 9,000 were former residents 
of towns in the Brcko municipality who moved into Brcko town after virtually the entire 
Bosniac and Croat population was expelled. The remainder were DPs (displaced persons) 
from the Krajina, Sarajevo, and a number of Bosnian towns.151 Until the First Award of 14 
                                                 
147  That was headed by the Deputy Prime Minister and the Minister for Reconstruction and Development.  
148  S/1997/487 of 23 June 1997, para 7, p.3. 
149  The RS may be granted legitimate need to move military forces and equipment through the District with 
SFOR permission. See: Final Award, 5 March 1999, para 41, p.11. 
150  Award, Rome, 14 February 1997, para 45, p.14. 
151  Ibid., para 53, p.17. 
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February 1997, there had only been returns of 15 Bosniac families to Brcko town. Fear was 
assumed to be the major impediment. South of the town, where Bosniacs had attempted to 
reconstruct their homes, 27 houses had been destroyed by bombings.152  
Between the first and the Supplemental Award on 15 March 1998, the RS police 
systematically intimidated any Bosniacs and Croats who explored the possibility of returning 
to their former homes in the area. Those few Bosniac and Croat families who still lived in the 
area were put under pressure to leave.153 The Federation’s record of compliance with the letter 
and spirit of the Dayton Accords has also been hardly perfect. There was considerable 
evidence that Federation authorities have acted to inhibit the return of former Serb residents to 
Sarajevo and other communities within the Federation. This is of relevance to Brcko because 
several thousand Serbs who formerly lived in Sarajevo currently occupy homes of Bosniacs 
and Croats who would like to return to Brcko.154 Nevertheless, more returns of DPs and 
refugees were achieved in the period up to March 1998 than throughout all the rest of the 
RS.155 One must emphasise that no Bosniac and Croat returns were accomplished into Brcko 
town. Instead, they were confined to the rural areas south and west. The Bosniacs’ main 
objection to return is the need to accept RS identity cards upon returning to RS territory. 
During the hearings prior to the Final Award of 5 March 1999, the point was made that 
Serb DPs in Brcko are becoming more and more "cemented" in position, and that Bosniacs 
and Croats are beginning to abandon hope of returning to Brcko, moving off to other areas 
instead. During 1998 hard-line SDS officials encouraged Brcko’s Serb DPs and refugees to 
stay where they were, whether or not recovery of their own homes elsewhere was a real 
possibility. The obstructions apparently had the desired results. According to UNHCR, in 
1998 more than 7,600 Serbs returned officially to the Federation from various parts of the RS. 
The movement from Brcko to the Federation was negligible. Out of approximately 26,000 
Serb DPs in Brcko, only 142 Serb families applied to return to the Federation; and far fewer 
actually moved. According to one local Serb official, during the two years, 1997-98, only nine 
Serbs left Brcko to the Federation.156 Therefore, it was concluded that any further delay in the 
arbitration process would continue to reduce the chances of ethnic reintegration in the Brcko 
area.157 It is the Tribunal’s expectation that, with a greater degree of democracy in the area 
and a lessening of anti-return propaganda and intimiation, which must be accompanied by 
                                                 
152  Ibid., para 54, p. 17 
153  Supplemental Award, 15 March 1998, para 7, p.4. 
154  Ibid., para 8, p.5. 
155  Ibid., para 14, p.7. 
156  Final Award, 5 March 1999, para 25, p.8. 
157  Ibid., para 5, p.5. 
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increased return-facilitation by the Federation, the existing prejudices of Brcko Serb DPs 
against return to their original homes will be alleviated and that the flow of DPs out of Brcko 
will increase, thus facilitating returns both ways. By November 1999, 1477 minority families 
- c. 5900 individuals had returned to the RS portion of the Brcko municipality.158 There is 
some hope to achieve more returns into town in the near future. On the other hand, finance for 
reconstruction is becoming a problem because donor aid is dropping off -  for example the 
UNHCR budget has been reduced by 50% for 2000.   
During the hearings for the Final Award, the Supervisor emphasised that it is virtually 
impossible to persuade either donor governments or private investors to fund the badly 
needed economic revitalisation of the depressed Brcko area until a final decision is made.159 
OHR is particularly reliant on the expertise and funding of organisations such as the World 
Bank, USAID, the European Commission, and governments. In a document prepared for the 
donors’ conference for Bosnia and Herzegovina in May 1999, the International Supervisor 
had proposed to establish a "Brcko Transitional Trust Fund" to equalize public salaries and 
pensions to citizens in the District and to be used as a depository for any revenue "shortfall" 
payments made by the entities until improvements and efficencies in the entities’ tax 
collection and expenditures are achieved.160 The Supervisor expected the fund to be needed 
for a maximum of two years and was to be managed by him with supervision and advice from 
a donor committee.161 Unfortunately, no finances were made available for the "Trust Fund".162 
Neverthelss, as a consequence of the Final Award, the atmosphere in the Brcko area has 
changed from hard-line Serb nationalism to a more tolerant environment, in which internal 
and external investors are genuinely interested.163 UNDP has launched a Village Employment 
and Environment Programme, supported by the European Commission, that targets 
employment, small business training and technical assistance, and the provision of additional 
small-to-medium business loans. The European Commission supports an agricultural reform 
project with Euro 4 million.164   
                                                 
158  Figures provided by Tim Yates, Chief of Staff, OHR-North, 10 November 1999. 
159  Final Award, 5 March 1999, para 5, p.5. 
160  In 1998 the RS Brcko municipality allocated only 26% of its annual budget for employee salaries while 
nearly 40% was spent under the catch-all category of "other costs".   
161  Brcko Implementation Projects in Support of the March 5, 1999 Brcko Final Arbitration Award, Prepared 
for the May 20-21, 1999 Donors’ Conference for Bosnia and Herzegovina, by Ambassador Robert W. 
Farrand, Deputy High Representative and International Supervisor of Brcko, OHR-North, p.10. 
162  According to Tim Yates, Chief of Staff, OHR-North, 10 November 1999.    
163  Evaluation by Tim Yates, Chief of Staff, OHR-North, 10 November 1999. 
164  Brcko Implementation Projects in Support of the March 5, 1999 Brcko Final Arbitration Award, Prepared 
for the May 20-21, 1999 Donors’ Conference for Bosnia and Herzegovina, prepared by Ambassador Robert 
W. Farrand, Deputy High Representative and International Supervisor of Brcko, OHR-North, p.6.   
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Although deemed "shallowly rooted" by the Supervisor, in spring 1998 a multi-ethnic 
Municipal Assembly, Administration and Judiciary were in place.165 The Supervisor noted 
that the process of integration was still characterised by a lack of support for the multi-ethnic 
governmental institutions, ranging from minor obstructionism to serious disobedience of his 
orders. In addition, the multi-ethnic administration made slow progress due to the lack of a 
genuine multi-ethnic environment. Furthermore, relations between the Mayor (Serb) and the 
two Deputy Mayors (Bosniac and Croat) were marred by the Mayor’s failure to abide by the 
requirement that the Deputy Mayors countersign letters to the Municipal Assembly and by the 
Mayor’s refusal to allow the Deputy Mayors to place issues on the agenda of the Executive 
Board (municipal government). Serb block voting both on the Executive Board and in the 
Assembly effectively prevented those bodies from acting on issues that they were required to 
address by the Supervisory orders and the Tribunal’s Awards. Local leaders have also 
prevented ethnic integration in the lower ranks of the Brcko administration.166 The Joint 
Implementation Committee to draft the District Statute has presented the Statute for ‘The 
Brcko District of Bosnia and Herzegovina’, encompassing the complete territory of the Brcko 
municipality of January 1991, in its final form in December 1999. A Legal Review Team was 
established which is looking at the harmonisation or, if necessary, drafting of legislation for 
the new District. According to the Statute, District Judges, Prosecutors, Members of the 
Judicial Commission and police officers shall not be members of political parties or endorse 
political candidates or political party platforms.167 
The multi-ethnic police force is policing under IPTF monitoring significant new traffic 
over the Brcko highway bridge to Croatia and is patrolling throughout all areas of the city of 
Brcko as well as outlying districts. The Judiciary is working multi-ethnically, too. A Bosniac 
school was opened with a compromise educational curriculum in the RS portion.  
The analysis has shown that the three transitional administrations worked in a similar 
environment but under unequal circumstances and with different resources. Consequently, 
their outcomes as well as the durability of their achievements differ. What lessons can be 
learned from the concrete findings will be discussed in the final paragraph.      
                                                 
165  Supplemental Award, 15 March 1998, para 14, p.7. 
166  Final Award, 5 March 1999, para 33, p.10. 
167  Statute of the Brcko District of Bosnia and Herzegovina, December 1999, Article 15, Freedom of 
Association, p.6. 
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4. Conclusions: lessons learned from three international peace-building  
  
models 
  
More than three years after the termination of the EUAM one could say that the Euro-
pean operation was a smoothly running spaceship with a weak link to the mission control.  
Due to well functioning operational procedures within the administration and sufficiant funds 
from the European Commission, the reconstruction part of the mandate was an enormous 
success. Politically, there was no such success: no joint projects could be executed covering 
both sides. The EUAM contributed greately to the return to normal life in Mostar but could 
neither achieve the city’s physical nor its political and social reunification. The lack of 
success regarding the EUAM’s political mandate can be attributed to many reasons of which 
none was lying within the administration’s scope of control. First, the mandate was too 
ambitious. Considering the fact, that the brutal war between the two ethnic groups had only 
ceased four months before the EUAM was established, it was naive to believe that Croats and 
Bosniacs could resume cooperation immediately. Under the circumstances of lasting mistrust, 
the objective of a re-unified city was not achievable within two years.  
Second, the EUAM was too weak. The Bosnian Croat leaders accepted the EUAM only 
under the pressure from Zagreb and the international community, and made clear that they 
perceived the administration as an imposed ‘colonial’ system.168 The administration’s 
mandate was based on the consent and cooperation of the local parties, not on coercion. 
Accordingly, the Administrator was lacking the necessary means to implement the EU 
Ministers’ policy, e.g. executive power and military forces as its manifestation. Neither did 
the EUAM have a lever at hand to put pressure on the Croats toward compliance, nor did the 
numerous diplomatic rounds involving Croatian President Tudjman achieve more than verbal 
concessions toward that end.  
Third, the duration of the European presence in Mostar was clearly fixed in advance. 
Consequently, the Croats knew how long they could ask for financial and technical aid and, 
simultaneously, hinder any attempt toward political unification of the city. Owing the fact, 
that West Mostar was less destroyed than the Eastern part of the town and that some Croat 
mafiosi had alternative financial sources, the EUAM’s reconstruction aid neither represented 
a material incentive for the Croats nor did the withdrawal of funds pose a serious threat. On 
their side, the Administration was considered to be a tactical asset.  
                                                 
168  The EU Administration of Mostar - a balance after one year, Hans Koschnick, EU Administrator, p.4. 
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Fourth, the EUAM began its work in absence of an overall peace agreement for Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, which not only hampered the process of return of DPs and refugees but also 
kept the parties’ interests in constant flux, according to their gains and losses on the 
battlefield.  
Fifth, the Administrator’s scope of action over that political reality was limited by the 
European Council and its Presidency. For example, the May 1995 strategy document, which 
assumed the willingness of the parties to live under a common set of rules with a central 
municipal authority, was submitted to the Council Presidency. It was neither discussed by the 
Working Party, the management body of the Presidency, nor did the Administrator ever 
receive any feedback.169 Consequently, it did not result in the expected political backing for a 
possible modification of the EUAM’s mandate or the operation’s termination, although the 
Council of Ministers had reserved the right to do so at any time if it considered that there was 
a substantial change in the conditions or if any of the parties was not cooperative. 
Furthermore, when the Administrator exercised his right to arbitrate the neutral central zone, 
the Italian Council Presidency overturned his decision, which led to the Administrator’s 
resignation.  
Sixth, the procedures and mechanisms of the Common Foreign and Security Policy 
(CFSP) were not ready to guarantee an effective and efficient handling of a broad and long-
term policy action. Neither a preparation strategy and staff selection procedure upon qualifica-
tions nor a permanent structure for the overall supervision existed. The six-month rotation in 
the Council Presidency, however, has shown evidence of being ill-adapted to the need for 
continuity in the management of a longterm Joint Action. In addition, the decision making 
procedures on the different levels of council groups, often causing delays for further 
consultations with the capitals of the Member States, was too slow to respond to day-to-day 
matters concerning the preparatory work, the implementation process and financial matters.  
Seventh, the maintenance of the EU presence in Mostar was justified with the idea that 
the consolidation of the Federation could not be achieved without a peaceful modus vivendi in 
Mostar. As a matter of fact, the Federation became successively a system with coexisting 
ethnically pure zones in which a unified Mostar lost its legitimacy. In the end, none of 
Thomas G. Weiss’ indicators in determining success of multinational operations were 
fulfilled.  
                                                 
169 Court of Auditors, Preliminary Observations concerning the Accounts of the Administrator and the Euro-
pean Administration, Mostar, (EUAM), para 64, p.25. 
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UNTAES, by contrast, could already learn lessons from previous UN peace-keeping 
missions. Earlier UN mandates in the Balkans articulated a set of complex and often disparate 
goals, e.g. in creating Safe Areas in Bosnia, that were impossible to implement in the absence 
either of a broader political agreement or/and of adequate resources. Therefore, careful 
advance planning, sufficiant military and civilian staff support, full executive powers as well 
as demilitarisation of the region, were identified as necessary requirements for a successful 
multinational operation prior to the UNTAES deployment. Furthermore, the UNTAES was 
established with the pre-requisite of a clear win situation perceived by both involved local 
parties. The Basic Agreement required an achievable agenda with the peaceful reintegration 
of the region into the sovereign control of the Government of Croatia as its main political 
goal. In contrast to the EUAM, UNTAES’ timeframe was flexible, depending on realistic 
chances for progress. To achieve the entire set of mandated civilian tasks of economic, 
political, administrative and social reintegration of a region with a population of 140,000, 
UNTAES was staffed by a comprehensive team of 405 civilian staff members. In comparison, 
the EUAM with a more complex and difficult mandate operating in an ethnically divided city 
with a population of more than 60,000 was understaffed with 39 civilian staff members. The 
UNTAES was also allotted sufficient personnel to achieve its military objectives and to 
contribute significantly to the achievement of civilian goals. In view of the fact that no 
relatively short-lived operation can achieve a full reconciliation between indviduals who were 
recently embroiled in a painful fraternal war, UNTAES has created a framework in which 
reconciliation can take place. Furthermore, it has facilitated the normalisation of relations 
between the Republic of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and with it 
contributed to broader regional stability. Refering to Thomas G. Weiss and his concept of the 
comprehensive nature of inputs, the UNTAES was successful insofar as it could continue to 
proceed, with minor failures being outweighed by success in other areas. The shortcomings in 
the field of humanitarian aid, for example, were compensated with success in the military and 
political fields. However, only a few months after the end of the mission, the Security Council 
expressed its concern about increasing incidents of harrassment and intimidation of the local 
Serb community.170 Furthermore, because there are still no employment opportunities, the ori-
ginal residents were unlikely to remain and Croat DPs seemed unlikely to return. Following 
the wrap up of UNTAES in January 1998, the native Eastern Slavonian Serbs stayed in the 
                                                 
170    S/Prst/1998/32 of 6 November 1998, p. 1. 
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region, but approximately 40,000 Serb DPs left for Serbia, while approximately 30,000 Serbs 
went to other places in Croatia and 21,000 Croats have returned.171  
High expectations were raised concerning the achievements of the International Super-
visory Regime in Brcko. According to Tim Yates, the Chief of Staff of OHR-North, Brcko is 
a microcosm of Bosnia and if Brcko does not work the Dayton Peace Accords would need to 
be revised.172 As the Supervisor’s Office is to effect the administrative reunion of three ethnic 
groups, that do not share common interests, while enjoying only inadequate resources - no 
budget, little power, insufficiant support from the OHR Headquarters - the chances for 
success are even worse than in Mostar. The lever of the International Supervisory Regime to 
withdraw the authority over the municipality from one entity and give it to the other was lost 
with the Final Award. On the other hand, has the local Serbs’ compliance with the 
implementation efforts also been lacking with the threat of the Award. David Greenberg, 
Special Assistant to the International Supervisor, noted that rewarding one side could be 
destabilizing for the region and could hamper the overall peace process. If the town were 
awarded to the Serbs that would be interpreted by the Bosniacs and Croats as the public 
approval of "ethnic cleansing". The situation would naturally be reversed, were the Serbs to 
lose the strategic corridor, which is of vital interest to them because it connects the two halves 
of their entity.  
To conclude, the following lessons can be learned from the comparative analysis of 
three transitional administrations, which operated in multi-ethnic post-war environment. First, 
coherence in all actions undertaken by different components of the administration, even more 
so in the political unity among the governments directing the effort, is a precondition for a 
successful peace-building operation. Second, a clear win situation for all involved local 
parties is a prerequisite for success. There is no evidence in history that conflict resolution in 
multi-ethnic environment has ever been successful without the willingness of the former 
warring parties.173 Third, the Mostar case teaches that the improvement of living conditions 
does not necessarily renew ties of trust eventually leading to reconciliation, especially in the 
short run. Fourth, to put both, the civilian and military component, under a single authority 
not only simplifies coordination among the components; it also creates a more consistant and 
powerful image of the operation. Experience shows that the success or failure of an operation 
depends very much upon the leading agency’s public image. This image exists only as long as 
                                                 
171  Interviev with the former UNTAES Administrator Jacques Paul Klein, 1 June 1999, Sarajevo.  
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the people believe that it can be revitalised in emergency situations. Therefore, every 
transitional administration that is operating in an ethno-political post-war environment and is 
incapable of exercising its power and of demonstrating operational coherence is likely to be-
come a mere plaything among the local parties. Fifth, the timeframe needs to be flexible and 
conditional as to the implementation achievements. Otherwise, the operation is likely to be 
taken as a tactical asset, and the achievements will be jeopardised as soon as international 
presence is withdrawn. Hence, the EUAM’s departure on 1 January 1997 was followed by a 
number of violant incidents in Mostar. These incidents were aimed at further reinforcing the 
segregation between the Croat and Bosniac parts of the city. They were seen as a real danger 
to the EU’s investment in the reconstruction of Mostar and its efforts to rebuild a 
multicultural, multi-ethnic and multireligious society.174  
A political vision for the region’s future and a strategic concept, which formulates 
guidelines for the international actors, and calls upon the local peoples to contribute to the 
reconstruction of their countries, have been sorely lacking in the Balkans. As far as the future 
is concerned, the international community needs to invest more time in better and broader 
planning to guarantee its multinational peace-building activities’ effectiveness.175 One can 
only hope that the experience gained in the three transitional administrations will lead to 
better success for the UN Administration in Kosovo (UNMIK), and that the lessons learned 
during the past years of the Yugoslav conflict will enable the Balkan Stability Pact to 
contribute to the longterm mission of conflict resolution in the region. 
 
                                                 
174 Official Journal of the European Communities, No C 85/148, 17 March 1997, 12. Former Yugoslavia and 
non-compliance with Dayton Agreements, Resolution on the situation in Mostar and Brcko. 
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